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T H E  N A T I O N A L  C O M M I T T E E  FOR A  S A N E  N U C L E A R  P O L I C Y  

BELGRADE: THE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED STATES 
INTRODUCTION 
The Belgrade Conference of the Heads of State or Government 
of Non-Aligned Countries was held at a time-early September, 1961- 
when U.S. opinion, both official and public, was never more favorable 
toward the so-called "neutrals." When Mr. Khrushchev suddenly 
announced the resumption of nuclear weapons tests and thus gave the 
25 heads of state assembled in Yugoslavia a clear opportunity to use 
their independent judgment and their "moral force," the Conference 
displayed a curious and dismaying double standard. Editorial writers 
and cartoonists in the West pointedly criticized the "noncommitted." 
Even the friends of these countries in the West were seriously jolted. 
This pamphlet describes the origins of the Belgrade Conference 
and its accomplishments. There is no attempt to gloss over the double 
standard on the nuclear test issue, but an effort is made to explain it. 
In addition, the pamphlet puts the Conference's reaction to the resurnp- 
tion of nuclear tests in perspective. The heads of state made many wise 
decisions on a host of other issues. The non-aligned states are likely to 
continue as a formidable political force in the world and at the United 
Nations, if not a third bloc. 
This pamphlet is dedicated to U Thant of Burma. He was a 
delegate to the Belgrade Conference on the eve of the tragic death of 
Dag Hammarskjold. His experience, temperament, and non-alignment 
combined to make him the unanimous choice of the 100 or more member 
nations-many aligned--as Acting Secretary General of the United 
Nations. 
-Homer A. Jack 
Dr. Jack represented the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy at 
the Belgrade Conference. He was accorded official observer status, the only 
American to be given this opportunity. He also attended the Bandung Conference 
in 1955 as a journalist and the first All-African People's Conference in 1958 as 
a fraternal delegate from the American Committee on Africa. Since 1959 Dr. Jack 
has been a nongovernmental observer at the United Nations. 
Published by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 17 East 45th 
Street, New York 1, N.Y. Quantity prices on request. Printed in the U.S.A. 
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FROM BANDUNG TO BELGRADE 
"This Conference is not an isolated event in the emergence 
of the new social forces. It is one of a series of major 
events in this process of emergence."-President Sukarnz 
The Asian-African Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 
April, 1955, was one of the most important international gatherings 
in the twentieth century. Conceived by the Columbo Powers (India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon), the Conference was an effort 
to consolidate the multiple revolutions in Asia against colonialism, 
racism, poverty, and disease and to spread these revolutions to Africa. 
Present were the leaders of the ex-colonial world: Nehru, Chou En-lai, 
Sukarno, Nasser, U Nu, and many others. Some 27 independent Asian 
and African nations attended the Conference as well as representatives 
from two African colonies on the threshold of independence: the Gold 
Coast (Ghana) and the Sudan. 
Although the Bandung Conference communique provided for 
consultations among the five Columbo powers to convene a second 
conference, none has been called. Indonesia has continued to encourage 
the convening of a second Bandung, but so far without success. Several 
of the original Columbo powers were hesitant to form a bloc; neither 
did they want to face the difficult decision of whether or not the 
U.S.S.R. should be invited to any second Asian-African conference. One 
continuing outcome of the original Bandung Conference has been, 
however, the close and fruitful cooperation of the Asian-African states 
as a caucussing group at the U.N. 
Since Bandung, Africa has come into the world spotlight. At the 
Bandung gathering, Africa was quite a junior partner, with only six 
nations in attendance: Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Liberia, Libya, and 
Sudan. With the birth of many new nations, the African states since 
1958 have held their own continental conferences. In April, 1959, 
Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana convened the first Conference of 
Independent African States. Eight nations were present: Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. This stimulated 
the formation of the African caucussing group at the U.N. The second 
meeting of this group was held in Addis Ababa in June, 1960, with a 
wider representation. In December, 1958, Prime Minister Nkrumah 
sponsored, also in Accra, the first All-African People's Conference. This 
has been called "the African Bandung," for present were such nationalist 
leaders as Tom Mboya, H. Karnuzu Banda, Patrice Lumumba, Kenneth 
Kaunda, Holden Roberto, and Joshua Nkomo, as well as Prime Minister 
Nkrumah. A permanent secretariat was established and subsequent con- 
ferences were held in Tunis in January, 1960, and in Cairo in March, 
1961. 
The unity of Africa has since been fragmented, partly in trying 
to solve its own problems, especially the Congo. After a preliminary 
meeting in Abidjan in October, 1960, organized by F6lix Houphouet- 
Boigny of the Ivory Coast, statesmen of many of the African nations 
formerly part of the French Community met in Brazzaville in December, 
1960. They tried to find a common judgment on the tangled Congo 
situation and to induce France to reach a solution to the Algerian 
impasse. The "Brazzaville Twelve" included Cameroun, Chad, Central 
African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. In January, 
1961, still another grouping of African states met in Casablanca, partly 
on Morocco's urging to support her opposition to the seating of Mauri- 
tania at the U.N. and partly to bolster the Stanleyville regime in the 
Congo. Present were the heads of state of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, 
and the U.A.R., and representatives from Libya, Ceylon, and the Pro- 
visional Government of Algeria. Still a third configuration of African 
states gathered in Monrovia, Liberia, in May, 1961. Present were the 
heads of state of Cameroun, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierre 
Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta. In addition, delegations were 
present from Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, and Libya. 
This was the largest official African conference to date, although 
Nkrumah of Ghana, Nasser of the U.A.R., and S6kou Tour6 of 
Guinea were conspicuously absent. 
In the autumn of 1960, when the heads of many states converged 
upon New York for the opening of the 15th UN. General Assembly, 
the prime ministers of Ghana, India, Indonesia, U.A.R., and Yugoslavia 
found themselves working together in an unsuccessful effort to induce 
Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower to enter into talks to 
lessen world tensions. On this occasion seeds were planted for further 
contact amongst these leaders of the non-aligned nations. This desire 
for closer consultations was enhanced by the travels of President Sukarno 
and President Tito, especially the visits of the latter to Accra in March, 
1961, and to Cairo in April, 1961. 
Thus on April 26, 1961, presidents Nasser and Tito addressed 
a communication to the heads of state of 21 non-aligned countries 
suggesting that, in view of world developments and increasing tension, 
a conference be held before the convening of the lGth U.N. General 
Assembly. President Sukarno of Indonesia associated himself with the 
need for such a meeting. On May 18,1961, the presidents of Yugoslavia, 
Indonesia, and the U.A.R., joined by the Prime Minister of India, 
invited a number of non-aligned countries to send representatives to a 
preparatory meeting in Cairo beginning on June 5th. To this meeting 
came delegates from the following states: Afghanistan, Burma, Cam- 
bodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, U.A.R., Yemen, and Yugo- 
slavia. Nine of these countries were represented by their foreign 
ministers. Brazil sent an observer. 
PREPARING FOR BELGRADE 
"When I had the honor of meeting my friend, President 
Josip Broz Tito, in Cairo and Alexandria at the end of 
April, this year, we reviewed the international situation 
since our last meeting in September, 1960, at the General 
Assembly session."-President Gumal Abdel NasJer 
At the preparatory meeting in Cairo, it was initially proposed that 
immediate invitations go to the Provisional Government of Algeria 
and to the Stanleyville (Gizenga) regime of the Congo. After prolonged 
discussion, it was the preponderant view that the Provisional Govern- 
ment of Algeria be invited to the preparatory sessions, but that the 
Stanleyville government be invited only to the Conference. Several 
delegations strongly dissented from this decision and this controversy 
led to a consideration of the total composition of the Conference. It 
was decided to adopt certain criteria to decide which countries could 
be invited "to participate effectively and in the spirit of wholehearted 
cooperation." Some delegates wanted to guard against invitations to 
countries "which were 'non-aligned' in name only." Also it was agreed, 
in some cases, to make informal approaches to prospective invitees, 
so embarrassment would be avoided both to the countries invited and 
to the sponsors if the invitations were rejected. Finally, five criteria 
were adopted as the basis of issuing invitations to states to attend the 
Conference: 
"1. The country should have adopted an independent policy based 
on the co-existence of States with different political and social systems 
and on non-alignment or should be showing a trend in favor of such 
a policy. 
"2. The country concerned should be consistently supporting the 
movements for national independence. 
"3. The country should not be a member of a multilateral military 
alliance concluded in the context of great power conflicts. 
"4. If a country has a bilateral military agreement with a great 
power, or is a member of a regional defense pact, the agreement or 
pact should not be one deliberately concluded in the context of great 
power conflicts. 
"5. If it has conceded military bases to a foreign power, the 
concession should not have been made in the context of great power 
conflicts." 
The practical application of these criteria raised additional ques- 
tions. It was finally agreed to form a continuing credentials committee 
consisting of countries present which had diplomatic representation in 
Cairo. This committee was charged with securing additional acceptances 
using the approved criteria. 
At the preparatory meeting the agenda of the Conference was 
also discussed. The following draft agenda was adopted: 
"I. Exchange of views on the international situation. 
"11. Establishment and strengthening of international peace and 
security. 
1. Respect for the rights of peoples and nations to self- 
determination, struggle against imperialism, liquidation of 
colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
States; noninterference and nonintervention in internal affairs 
of States. 
3. Racial discrimination and apartheid. 
4. General and complete disarmament; banning of nuclear 
tests; problem of foreign military bases. 
5. Peaceful co-existence among States with different political 
and social systems. 
6. Role and structure of the U.N. and the implementation of 
its resolutions. 
"111. Problem of unequal economic development; promotion of 
international economic and technical cooperation. 
"IV. Any other matters. 
"V. Communique of the Conference." 
Three nations-Yugoslavia, Cuba, and the U.A.R.---offered to be 
hosts to the Conference. It was voted to hold the Conference in Yugo- 
slavia beginning on September 1, 1961. The host country was given the 
task of administering the Conference. The official languages were to be 
Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. The expenses of the Conference 
were to be shared in an equitable manner. 
Between the end of the preparatory meetings on June 12th and 
the opening of the Conference on September lst, the committee of 
ambassadors in Cairo made a number of inquiries in an effort to enlarge 
the number of states to be present. Some of the initial sponsors wanted 
a wider range of states represented. Togo, Uppee Volta, and Nigeria 
publicly turned down invitations and it was reported that other states 
(e.g., Mexico) did so privately. Additional states which were not present 
at the Cairo preparatory meetings but which did attend the Conference 
included the Congo (Premier Adoula as well as Vice-Premier Gizenga) , 
Cyprus, Lebanon, Somalia, Tunisia, and Yemen. In addition to Brazil, 
Bolivia and Ecuador agreed to send observers. 
By the end of July, two meetings were held in Belgrade to reach 
agreement on administrative procedures. On August 27-28, a com- 
mirtee on organization met also in Belgrade. Draft rules ofprocedure for 
the Conference were adopted. Yugoslavia agreed to meet all Conference 
expenses incurred, except those for translation and transcription. U.N. 
and U.A.R. personnel were hired for simultaneous translation. These 
expenses were shared by all states represented except Algeria, with 
India paying 25 per cent and several of the smaller states paying only 
1.21 per cent each. Leo Mates, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of 
Yugoslavia, was named secretary of the Conference. 
THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE 
"In the present extremely tense international situation, 
this Conference is the most competent forum, outside the 
United Nations, where the representatives of non-aligned 
countries can state, as simply and as strongly as possible, 
their views regarding . . . promoting world peace and con- 
structive cooperation among peoples." 
-President Josip Broz Tito 
The Conference opened on September first with 24 srates repre- 
sented by heads of state or government or by ranking diplomats. Before 
its conclusion, the premier and vice-premier of the Congo (Leopoldville) 
also appeared. A list of the heads of state present is given in Table 1. 
Each head of state was accompanied by a delegation of diplomats. It 
was estimated that these delegations totalled more than 500 persons. 
The well-known personalities present who were not heads of state 
included V. K. Krishna Menon and B. K. Nehru of India, Ali Sastro- 
amidjojo of Indonesia (chairman of the Bandung Conference), and 
U Thant of Burma. 
In addition, Yugoslavia accredited official observers from non- 
governmental organizations. These included Holden Roberto of the 
TABLE 1. 
The Heads of State or Government and Chiefs of 
Delegations Present at the Belgrade Conference 
AFGHANISTAN: Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad 
Daud Khan. 
ALGERIA (PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT) : 
Prime Minister Ben Youssef Ben Khedda. 
BURMA: Prime Minister U Nu. 
CAMBODIA: Prince Norodom Sihanouk ( head of state) . 
CEYLON: Prime Minister (Mrs.) Sirimavo R. Bandaranaike. 
CONW (LEOPOLDVILLE) : Premier Cyrille Adoula. 
CUBA: President Osvaldo Dorticos (Torrado) . 
CYPRUS: President (Archbishop) Makarios. 
ETHIOPIA: Emperor Haile Selassie I. 
GHANA: President Kwame Bh.unah. 
GUINEA: Luis Lansana Beavogui 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs) . 
INDIA: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. 
INDONESIA: President Ahmed Sukarno. 
IRAQ: Hashim Jawad (Minister of Foreign Affairs). 
LEBANON: Prime Minister Saeb Salam. 
MALI : President Modibo Keita. 
MOROCCO: King Hassan II. 
NEPAL: King Maharajadhiraja Bir Bikrarn. 
SAUDI ARABIA: Sheikh Ibrahim Sowayel 
(Minister of Foreign Affairs). 
SOMALIA: President Aban Abdullah Osman 
SUDAN: President Ibrahim Abboud. 
TUNISIA: President Habib Bourguiba. 
u.A.R.: President Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
YEMEN: Prince Seyful Islam El Hassan 
(Permanent Representative to the U.N.). 
YUGOSLAVIA: President Josip Broz Tito. 
BOLIVIA : Jose Tellman Valorde 
(Minister of Education). 
BRAZIL: Afranio de Melo Franco 
(Ambassador to Switzerland) . 
ECUADOR: Dr. Jose Joaquim Silva 
(Ambassador to West Germany). 
Union of the Peoples of Angola, Oliver R. Tambo of the South African 
United Front, Sam Njoma of the South West Africa People's Organiza- 
tion, Michael Scott of the Africa Bureau (London), and Homer A. 
Jack of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (New York) . 
A huge press corps converged os Belgrade for the Conference. 
They totalled more than 1,000 reporters, photographers, and writers. 
There were 121 journalists from the United States, only outnumbered 
by the Yugoslavian press ( 140 persons). Other large press contingents 
included West Germany ( 59) ,  UX. (45), U.A.R. (44), France and 
Italy (38 each), and India (20). The US.S.R. sent nine reporters and 
China was represented by seven. 
Most of the plenary sessions of the Conference were held in the 
Federal Parliament Building in downtown Belgrade, built in Italian 
Renaissance style and flanked by two huge sculptured horses. The pink 
and yellow marble chamber was fitted with a huge circular table and 
with a seat for each head of state. There were chairs for five members 
of each delegation behind the head of state. On the main floor were 
also seats for distinguished guests from Yugoslavia and the Conference 
stenographers and space for television cameras. In the balcony were 
separate sections for the diplomatic corps accredited to Belgrade, the 
press, and official nongovernmental observers. There was simultaneous 
translation into English, Arabic, and French by means of individual 
transistor radios. Two of the plenary sessions were closed and held in 
the Federal Executive Council Building in New Belgrade. 
The several hundred persons allowed in the balcony and the thou- 
sands of Yugoslavs watching the full coverage of the plenary sessions 
on television saw interesting sights. Archbishop Makarios planted a kiss 
on the cheek of President Nasser. The latter and President Bourguiba 
slapped each other on the shoulder. President Nkrumah tried to amuse 
Emperor Haile Selassie. 
National costumes predominated. Sheikh Sowayel and his colleagues 
from Saudi Arabia wore the black bisht, white k&yeh, and gold agal 
of Bedouin tradition. Foreign Minister Beavogui of Guinea wore a 
flowing striped robe with a red skullcap embroidered in gold. The 
ladies from Guinea wore rainbow-hued organdie gowns and headscarves. 
Archbishop Makarios wore the black robes and high-crowned hat of 
a Greek Orthodox prelate. Prince Seyful of Yemen had a white turban 
while Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia wore a white duck jacket. V. K 
Krishna Menon sported his cane and Jawaharlal Nehru wore the Gandhi 
cap and a rosebud in his tunic. President Sukarno was dressed in a white 
double-breasted suit, rows of military ribbons, and a black caracul hat. 
Many heads of state wore traditional, subdued Western clothes, such 
as President Tito, Emperor Haile Selassie, President Nasser, and 
President Nkrumah. 
There were several informal receptions and dinners during the 
Conference. At the largest in the Metropole Hotel, Marshal Tito played 
host ro the heads of state, and other special guests, while several thou- 
sand persons watched this "family party" for which protocol was disre- 
garded. Along with caviar and lobster, there was whisky from Britain, 
vermouth from Italy, vodka from the Soviet Union, and plum brandy 
(slivovitz) from Yugoslavia. A 12-piece band played jazz while the 
guests drank and ate. 
The city of Belgrade was tidied for the "konferencija." Buildings 
were whitewashed, fluorescent street lights emplaced, and fountains and 
flower-arrangements constructed. Uniformed militiamen were brought 
to Belgrade from the provinces. 
The heads of state were quartered in private villas, although some 
preferred to live in the big hotels. The press had its working head- 
quarters in a large trade union center on Marx and Engels Square. 
THE PLENARY iSESSlONS 
' I  
, .  "Belgrade, which has throughout its long history seen 
'matiy wars of conquest, invasions and invaders . . . now 
for the first time has the opportunity to welcome in its 
midst. the highest representatives of 27 countries-cham- 
pions of peace."-President losip Broz Tito 
. . 
The principal .business of the Conference was transacted during 17 
plenary sessions. An outline of each session follows. 
SEPTEMBER FIRST 
FI@T PLENARY SESSION. President Tito opened the Conference at 
10:ob'a.m. with a minute of silence honoring all those who lost their 
lives in the struggle for freedom and independence. He then made a 
speech of welcome. The agenda of the first session was adopted. The 
presence of 24 delegations and two observers was aflirmed. The Con- 
ference'agenda and rules of procedure were adopted as well as a report 
on'financial and organizational matters. President Sukarno initiated the 
general debate. 
SECOND PLENARY SESSION. General Abboud was chairman. Presi- 
dent Nasser spoke. The session adjourned at 1:00 p.m. 
* THIRD PLENARY SESSION. President Bourguiba was chairman. 
Conference secretary Leo Mates read messages from King Ibn Saud of 
Saudi Arabia, President Sekou Tourk of Guinea, President Victor Paz 
Estenssoro of Bolivia, and Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic 
of China. He also announced that greetings had been received from a 
number of non-governmental organizations and nationalist movements. 
Speeches were given by General Abboud and President U Nu. 
FOURTH PLENARY SESSION. President Nasser was chairman. 
Speeches were delivered by President Bourguiba and Prime Minister 
Daud. 
SEPTEMBER SECOND 
FIFTH PLENARY SESSION. Prince El Hassan was chairman. Emperor 
Haile Selassie I and President Nkrumah participated in the general 
debate. President Nasser proposed that a drafting committee be ap- 
pointed. After some discussion, it was decided to continue the general 
debate and to form a drafting committee to which every delegation 
would appoint one representative. The first meeting of the committee 
was held in the afternoon. 
SIXTH PLENARY SESSION, Prime Minister Daud was chairman. 
Secretary Mates read messages from Premier A. K. Kassem of Iraq, 
President Kennedy, and Premier Khrushchev. Speeches were given by 
Prime Minister Nehru ( the only extemporaneous address) and Presi- 
dent Dorticos. 
SEVENTH PLENARY SESSION. Prime Minister Ben Khedda was 
chairman. The Secretary read a message from the President of the Royal 
Council of Cambodia. Prime Minister Saeb Salam and Foreign Minister 
Sheikh Sowslyel spoke. 
EIGHTH PLENARY SESSION. Prime Minister U Nu was chairman 
of this evening session which began at 6:40 p.m. King Mahendra Bir 
Bikram and Dr. Hashim Jawad spoke in the general debate. 
SEPTEMBER THIRD 
NINTH PLENARY SESSION. President Dorticos was chairman. 
Speakers included President Tito and Archbishop Makarios. 
TENTH PLENARY SESSION. Archbishop Makarios was chairman, 
with Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Prince Sihanouk as speakers. 
ELEVENTH PLENARY SESSION. Emperor Haile Selassie I was chair- 
man. Speeches were made by King Hassan 11, President Modibo Keita, 
and Jose Tellman Valorde ( of Bolivia) . 
SEPTEMBER FOURTH 
TWELFTH PLENARY SESSION. President Nkrumah was chairman. 
Foreign Minister Beavogui and President Osman spoke in the general 
debate. 
THIRTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. Foreign Minister Beavogui was 
chairman and addresses were made by Prime Minister Ben Khedda and 
Prince Hassan, 
FOURTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. This was a closed meeting. It 
was attended only by the leader of each delegation accompanied by one 
adviser. The session opened at 4: 50 p.m. and closed at 8: 30 p.m. 
SEPTEMBER FIFTH 
FIFTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. Premier Salam was chairman. 
Prince Sihanouk announced that his government decided to recognize 
de jure the Provisional Government of Algeria. President Khedda 
welcomed this action and asked other countries to follow Cambodia's 
example. Presidents Tito and Nknunah announced that their govern- 
ments would grant de jure recognition to the Provisional Government 
of Algeria. Speeches were made by Premier Adoula and Vice-Premier 
Gizenga. A minute of silence was observed in tribute to Patrice 
Lumumba of the Congo. 
SIXTEENTH PLENARY SESSION. This was a closed meeting, again 
attended only by the heads of delegations and one other member from 
each delegation. The text of documents drawn up by the drafting 
committee was discussed, amended, and approved. The session ended at 
1:15 am. 
SEPTEMBER SIXTH 
SBVBNTEBNTH PLENARY SESSION. King Hassan I1 chaired this 
closing session which began at 2:00 a.m. A representative of Brazil 
took his seat as an observer. James Barington of Burma read the final 
Conference documents. King Hassan I1 gave the closing address. The 
Conference adjourned before 3:00 a.m. 
WHAT IS NON-ALIGNMENT? 
"The non-aligned countries represented at this Conference 
do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They 
sincerely desire to co-operate with any Government which 
seeks to contribute to the strengthening of confidence and 
peace in the world. . . . They consider that the further 
extension of the noncommitted area of the world consti- 
tutes the only possible and indispensable alternative to the 
policy of total division of the world into blocs, and intensi- 
fication of cold war policies."-Belgrade DecEatatwn 
The Belgrade Conference was ocganized by non-aligned states to 
project the non-aligned judgment of world problems on the world 
stage. If the preparatory conference in Cairo had difficulty in creating a 
definition of non-alignment (see p. 5 ) , the heads of state in the general 
debate added several facets to the world's understanding of their own 
concept of non-alignment. 
In a real sense Prime Minister Nehru has been the architect of 
the concept of non-alignment. He and his country faced misunder- 
standing and criticism for a decade because of this position. Mr. Nehru 
was able at Belgrade to observe: "It is a strange thing that some few 
years ago-six, seven, or eight, if you like-this business of non-align- 
ment was a rare phenomenon. A few countries here and there talked 
about it and other countries rather made fun of it, or at any rate did 
not take it seriously. 'Non-alignment? What is this? You must be on 
this side or that side.' That was the argument. Well, that argument is 
dead today; nobody dare say that, because the whole course of history 
of the last few years has shown the growing opinion, the spread of this 
conception of non-alignment." If more countries have now accepted 
this concept, most still differ somewhat on its essence. And much of the 
aligned world is still unclear about its meaning. 
The non-aligned nations at Belgrade agreed that they are not 
neutral. Thus President Makarios declared: "Our neutrality is not 
conceived in the sense of remaining indifferent and passive to world 
problems." President Nkrumah criticized "negative neutralism" and 
those states which avoid "taking a definite stand on issues which affect 
the balance of power in the world today." He added that "negative 
neutralism is no shield at all; and in my view negative neutralism is a 
completely impracticable policy, and even dangerous." President 
Sukarno also said that "non-alignment is not neutrality; it is not the 
sanctimonious attitude of the man who holds himself aloof-'a plague 
on both your houses."' There was, however, one kind of neutrality 
which some of the heads of state in Belgrade endorsed-neutrality in 
the power struggle between the two blocs and thus in the cold war. 
Emperor Haile Selassie declared: "We mean, in sum, that we are all, 
in the ultimate sense, neutral in the cold war which rages unabated 
in the world today." With this frequent exception, the heads of state 
do not like to be called "neutrals" or "noncomrnitted." 
Objectivity and independence were two concepts used repeatedly 
by the non-aligned. These statesmen felt that, because of their non- 
involvment, they could approach world problems with more objectivity 
and independence than nations wedded to one bloc or the other. King 
Hassan I1 spoke of their choices being 'b ided  by constant objectivity." 
Foreign Minister Sowayel suggested that "non-alignment means that 
our souls must be innocent of any bias towards any bloc in a dispute. 
Freed of any bias, our feelings can examine problems freely." Archbishop 
Makarios also talked of non-alignment as being "the source of our 
freedom of judgment and independent approach to world problems." 
There is only a short distance from this concept of objectivity to 
one of morality. The non-aligned states are not a military force or an 
economic force, but their leaders often call them a moral force. Thus 
Archbishop Makarios labelled the Conference a "world moral force." 
Emperor Haile Selassie talked of their serving as "the collective con- 
science of the world." President Nknunah used the designation, "moral 
force." So did President Sukarno in calling the Conference a "co-or- 
dinated accumulated moral force." President Osman hoped that they 
would always "act in accordance with the moral dictates of our con- 
science." President Bourguiba likened the group to a "moral 'striking 
force' which, if well directed, will sooner or later overcome another 
well-known 'striking force.' " President Nasser hoped that they would 
be "the power of conscience in this world." 
The non-aligned states have some common commitments, but they 
were not explicitly designated at Belgrade. One can, however, generalize 
in suggesting that the commitments of the "noncommitted include 
initially peaceful co-existence and then peace and not war, independence 
and not colonialism, equality and not racism, economic development 
and not continued poverty, and support for the U.N. No such sys- 
tematic platform was constructed at Belgrade. 
The dangers of non-alignment were not ignored at the Conference. 
The chief one expressed was the fear that the nations assembled would 
form their own bloc. President Makarios said that it was "not the 
purpose of this Conference to create a third bloc." This would "involve - 
limitations on objectivity." President Sukarno declared that "we abhor 
the very idea of blocs." President Tito asserted that "fears that this 
meeting might mark the beginning of the formation of a third bloc 
are groundless." However, several heads of state hoped that there would 
be more co-ordination amongst the 25 states than before. For example, 
Prime Minister Bandaranaike said: "We must not allow our spirit of 
unity and purpose which has been so evident at this Conference to 
disintegrate and fall apart. . . . We cannot, in my view, rely on the 
haphazard form of consultation which we have employed in the past.. . . 
We must adapt our procedures to meet that challenge. I would, therefore, 
suggest that some method should be devised by this Conference to 
enable our individual countries to ascertain the maximum area of 
agreement among ourselves, without the need of a formal Conference 
of Heads of State." But Prince Sihanouk warned that "the solidarity so 
essential to the non-aligned nations must not be permitted to develop 
into a rigidly exclusive bloc spirit." Because of this fear, the Conference 
adjourned without announcing the establishment of any machinery 
even for the limited objectives suggested by Mrs. Bandaranaike. 
Some of the additional dangers of non-alignment were not men- 
tioned by the heads of state. The objectivity of some nations is qualified 
by their commitments. Also it is qualified by the stature of their leaders, 
all of whom ate affected-as all human beings-by matters of power 
and prestige. Prince Sihanouk admitted that it has been suggested that 
the non-aligned countries try to establish their influence "by shamelessly 
exploiting the rivalry between the two nuclear blocs." He denied that 
he and his fellow statesmen would do so, but some of this exploitation 
is probably inevitable. 
The objectivity of the non-aligned is also tempered by strategy. 
Some heads of state evidently feel that plain-speaking often heightens 
tensions, not lessens them, and thus again both objectivity and morality 
are qualified. For example, Prince Sihanouk observed that while "certain 
Powers have committed and are still committing reprehensible acts, 
acts which we denounce," he felt that "to denounce these Powers by 
name, to insult them and threaten them has never-according to our 
humble exper iencdone  anything but make them more stubborn and 
entrench them still more deeply in their evil ways, for it is for them a 
question of humiliated pride." 
A final danger of non-alignment was suggested by Prime Minister 
Nehru. He told his fellow delegates that they could not issue mandates: 
"We must not overestimate our own importance. After all, we do not 
control the strings of the world, not only in the military sense but in 
other senses also. We  must realize both our actual and our potential 
strength that we have, and also the lack of strength that we have." 
* 
Most of these realities of non-alignment were discussed in one form 
or another in the general debate. 
NUCLEAR TESTS-" DOUBLE STANDARD? 
"The participants in the Conference consider it essential 
that an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and 
thermo-nuclear tests should be urgently concluded. With 
this aim in view, it is necessary that negotiations be imme- 
diately resumed, separately or as part of the negotiations 
on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on 
the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and 
observed by all countries."-BeIgrade Declaration 
When the Belgrade Conference was first conceived in the spring 
of 1961, US.-U.S.S.R. tensions were high. By the time the heads of 
state were preparing to attend the Conference, and writing their 
speeches for the general debate, the Berlin and German situation made 
tensions even more acute and World War I11 a possibility. Then on the 
very eve of the Conference, Premier Khrushchev publicly revealed that 
the Soviet Union would resume nuclear weapons tests. The announce- 
ment by President Kennedy that the U.S. would resume underground 
tests did not reach Belgrade until the final hours of the Conference. 
Premier Khrushchev's announcement shocked the heads of state 
and their delegations as it did much of the non-Communist world. Some 
heard of the Soviet move while enroute to Belgrade. For example, 
Indian reporters asked Prime Minister Nehru for his reaction to the 
Soviet announcement as soon as he landed at the Belgrade airport. He 
replied that he did not have the full details, but added: "I am against 
nuclear tests by any power." 
Although the resumption of Soviet tests heightened world tensions 
and constituted an added reason to hold the Belgrade Conference, 
Premier Khrushchev's act did not change the Conference itself. In the 
general debate, about two-thirds of the heads of state referred to the 
resumption of Soviet tests (see Table 2) .  Some wove this reference into 
their speeches in an extemporaneous manner, while a few perhaps did 
not refer to it at all because their speeches had been composed and 
printed weeks before. There was no move in the general debate to send 
an urgent resolution to Mr. Khrushchev to stop his testing program. 
Indeed, there is evidence that discussion in the drafting committee of 
the paragraph on nuclear tests was very brief. It appears that there was 
so much controversy on other issues-to emphasize world peace or 
colonialism, to send delegations to Moscow and Washington, to word - 
the Berlin-Germany statement judiciously, and to set a deadline on the 
ending of colonialism-that scant time was given in committee to the 
wording of the statement on nuclear tests. What is hard to believe is 
that none of the foreign ministers on the drafting committee and none 
of the heads of state in the penultimate plenary session realized that 
the wrath of the Western world would be directed to the Conference 
if it did not make some judgment, however mild, on the resumption 
of nuclear tests by the U.S.S.R. Such a judgment was lacking and all the 
Declaration did was to ask that a moratorium be resumed and observed 
by all countries. 
A second deficiency of the Belgrade Declaration relating to tests 
was its refusal to make a judgment on the substance of the test-ban 
negotiations in Geneva. The West had reason to hope that the Belgrade 
Conference would evaluate the Geneva talks and at least acknowledge 
that the West was bargaining in good faith and that the world could 
not countenance a troika control of any test-ban administration. Instead, 
TABLE 2. 
Excerpts from Speeches of Heads of State Pertaining to 
the Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests by the U.S.S.R. 
PRIME MINISTER BEN KHEDDA OF THE PROVISIONAL GOV- 
ERNMENT OF ALGERIA: "We must, of course, fight for the dis- 
continuance of nuclear explosions. . . ." 
PRIME MINISTER B ~ A R A N A I K B  OF CEYLON: "Unfortu- 
nately, disarmament negotiations, regarding both nuclear tests 
and general disarmament, have come to a standstill, and, what is 
worse, nuclear tests have been resumed by the Soviet Union." 
PREMIER CYRILLE ADOULA OF THE CONGO (LEOPOLDVILLE) : 
The resumption of nuclear tests "defies the legitimate hopes of 
mankind. . . . The nuclear race is in fact genocide." 
PRESIDENT DORTICOS OF CUBA: "The problem of the cessa- 
tion of thermo-nuclear tests is subordinated to the general prob- 
lem of disarmament and the elimination of situations of conflict 
which constitute a peril of war. A total agreement on disarm- 
ament would, at the same time, bring about the cessation of 
such tests." 
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS OF CYPRUS: "We were shocked to 
hear that the Soviet Union had declared its intention to resume 
nuclear tests and still more shocked to hear yesterday that it had 
already started such tests. In this connection I would also wish 
to place on record our concern over the carrying out of nuclear 
tests by France in Africa, against world opinion and in disregard 
of the protests of the people of that continent." 
PRESIDENT NKRUMAH OF GHANA: "Only last night, the 
Soviet Union exploded a nuclear device. This was a shock to me, 
as it must have been to you all. But it is a shock which forcibly 
brings home to us the supreme danger facing mankind." 
FOREIGN MINISTER BEAVOGUI OF GUINEA: "We should 
propose that the Conference should . . . decide that we shall sup- 
port efforts to reach agreement on general and controlled dis- 
armament and to stop all nuclear blasts immediately." 
PRIME MINISTER NEHRU OF INDIA: "This danger of war 
comes nearer and nearer, has been enhanced and has become 
nearer to us, perhaps, by the recent decision of the Soviet Govern- 
ment to start nuclear tests. Now I am not in a position, and I 
suppose no one else here is in a position, to know all the facts 
which underlie these decision+all the military considerations, 
political, non-political considerations, whatever they may be-but 
one thing I know: that this decision makes the situation much 
more dangerous. That is obvious to me; therefore I regret it 
deeply because it may well lead to other countries also starting 
this and then, apart from the danger inherent in nuclear tests- 
that is radioactive substances falling and all that-all  this brings 
us to the very verge and precipice of war. That is why I deeply 
regret it, and because of all this it has become even more urgent 
that this process of negotiation should begin without any delay, 
without thinking of who is going to ask whom first. The person 
who asks first will deserve the credit, not the person who shrinks 
from asking others." 
FORBIGN MINISTER JAWAD OF IRAQ: "It is therefore ex- 
tremely essential, in the scheme of total disarmament, to abolish 
the production and use of all nuclear weapons; prohibit once for 
all any kind of atomic tests, and to place these matters under an 
effective system of international control." 
PRESIDENT SALAM OF LEBANON: "We are truly astonished, 
as was the whole world, by the Soviet Union's resumption of 
nuclear weapons tests on an unimaginable scale. Our pain was 
increased by the fact that the declaration of this intention was 
issued on the very eve of our meeting here where we plan to 
urge all the powers to listen to the dictates of reason, and avoid 
for humanity a war of annihilation. This announcement should 
however increase our faith in the soundness of our objective." 
KING HASSAN I1 OF MOROCCO: "A limited agreement on 
discontinuing nuclear te ts  could at least have removed the danger 
of any increase in the number of countries in possession of atomic 
weapons. The three-power conference, however, that has been 
meeting for this purpose for more than two years has still not 
completed its work at Geneva. Morocco, a victim of the con- 
tinuation of nuclear tests, took decisive action in the U.N. which 
resulted in the adoption by the latter of a resolution condemning 
the French explosions in the Sahara; there has, alas, been no 
attempt to implement this resolution. Unfortunately, the news of 
the resumption of nuclear tests by the U.S.S.R. has caused us 
serious concern, coming as it does at a time when the whole 
world and we at this Conference were awaiting the conclusion 
of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests as a pre- 
liminary and decisive stage in progress towards general and 
complete disarmament." 
KING MAHARA JADHIRA JA OF NEPAL: "The course of nego- 
tiations on the ban of the nuclear tests has been equally tenuous, 
though more progress has been made in this field than in the 
other field (general disarmament). We believe the Conference 
must make it clear that the non-aligned countries are unitedly 
in favor of complete banning of nuclear tests." 
FOREIGN MINISTER SOWAYEL OF SAUDI ARABIA: ''The re- 
moval of the causes of fear and terror which lie behind the 
armaments race and nuclear tests must be one of the most im- 
portant aims of this meeting; the parties concerned must be 
persuaded of the essential need to disarm and halt nuclear tests." 
PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA OF TUNISIA: "IS it not a fact that 
what restrains the atomic powereFrance excepted-from new 
nuclear tests is world public opinion and the will to peace of the 
people? At the present time it is more than ever necessary for 
us to assert the determination of our peoples to oppose a united 
front to nuclear tests or the threat of the resumption of such 
experiments whatever may be the source of these tests or of such 
a threat. It is in this spirit that we express our opinion of the 
unexpected decision recently announced by a Great Power. This 
decision is liable to heighten international tension and increase 
the anxiety of the peoples." 
PRESIDENT NASSER OF THE U.A.R.: "Another cause for deep 
regret is the fact that in this atmosphere filled with anxiety, the 
Government of the Soviet Union found itself in a position 
which, according to its own paint of view, leads it to the re- 
sumption of nuclear tests. This decision shodred me just as it 
shocked world public opinion. Yet, whatever the motives of the 
Soviet Government that prompted this decision, the main thing 
in it is its clear bearing on the deterioration of the dangerous 
international situation. It is painful that the armament race is 
not confined to the U.S. and the Soviet Union alone, but we 
actually found other countries such as France which persist in 
provoking world public opinion by holding nuclear tests in the 
homeland of peoples who refuse to allow their land to be the 
field of such experiments." 
PRESIDENT TIT0 OF YUGOSLAVIA: "The negotiations on the 
discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests have also reached an 
impasse. What is even worst, a Western power which is a member 
of the Atlantic Pact-France-has failed to comply with the 
resolutions of the U.N. on the discontinuance of atomic tests, 
but continues to carry out such tests, while the other Western 
powers possessing atomic armaments have not taken any resolute 
measures against this. The matters have now reached a point 
where the Soviet Government has published a statement on the 
resumption of nuclear weapons tests. We  are not surprised so 
much by the communique on the resumption of atomic and 
hydrogen weapons tests, because we could understand the reasons 
adduced by the Government of the U.S.S.R. We  are surprised 
more by the fact that this was done on the day of the opening 
of this Conference of peace. All this has alarmed the world to 
an even greater extent." 
the Conference merely asked for an immediate resumption of negotia- 
tions, either separately (as the West wanted) or as part of general 
disarmament negotiations (as the Soviet Union desired). 
It has generally, but not uniformly, been concluded that the non- 
aligned states displayed a double standard by their handling of the 
test-ban issue at Belgrade. Had the West resumed nuclear tests first, 
the Belgrade Conference would have been much more outspoken. While 
some of the non-aligned states have made a habit of deflating the moral 
pretensions of the West, this double standard has called into serious 
question the objectivity and moral force of the non-aligned states 
themselves. 
Numerous conclusions have appeared to explain this double 
standard. Following are some of the more common explanations. 
The non-aligned states are pro-Souiet. There is little evidence to 
substantiate this claim. One or two of the 24 independent states repre- 
sented at Belgrade may have voted in recent months with the Soviet 
bloc at the U.N., but all 24 states have generally had an independent 
foreign policy. 
The non-digned states are impre,rsed by the Souiet potential. Others 
may feel that Communism is the ideology of the future, especially since 
the recent Russian conquests of space. They do not want to cut them- 
selves off from what they feel may be the ultimate winner in the current 
ideological struggle. 
The non-aligned states me i~imidated by Soviet miliitmy power. 
Some are contiguous neighbors of the Soviet Union or the People's 
Republic of China and they feel that they cannot afford to oppose 
blatantly a powerful neighbor. Some smaller states fear Soviet atomic 
and rocket power. They fall victims of Soviet atomic blackmail. Ter- 
rorized, they see no alternative to war other than to urge the West 
to accommodate to Russian demands. 
The nun-aligned states hate the Wes#. The legacy of colonialism 
and racism is so deep that some Asian and African states are unable to 
side with the West even on an issue in which the Soviet Union is 
wrong. The memories of recent European colonialism-from which the 
U.S. has not completely disengaged itself-remain vivid. Thus these 
states cannot bring themselves to denounce the Soviet Union since, by 
that act, they would be placing themselves on the side of their erstwhile 
colonial masters in the cold war. 
The non-aligned states expect far more from the West. The attitude 
of many of the non-aligned states toward the West is not one of simple 
hate, but consists of an ambivalent quality. Such leaders as Prime 
Minister Nehru and President Nkrumah have been schooled in the 
West and in many ways they are more Western than Asian or African. 
When the West does wrong, they are critical because they expect more 
from the West. When the Soviet Union does wrong, they are not sur- 
prised, because they expect less. This expectation of better political 
behavior from the West, despite the West's long period of colonial and 
racist misbehavior, may be a compliment to the West, but it does not 
weigh on the pragmatic scales of the cold war. 
The nun-aligwd state5 know how to influence Wester# p ~ b l i c  
opinion. In trying to modify the actions of the nuclear powers, the non- 
aligned states have to use different approaches. There is public opinion 
in the West. Public criticisms can, in time, affect Western public opinion 
which in turn can change Western policy. The non-aligned states feel 
that there is not the same kind of public opinion affecting policy under 
Communism. If they want to bring about changes in Soviet policy, they 
must act in a dzerent manner, probably through diplomatic channels. 
The non-aligned states think jhey understud the power struggle 
within the Soviet Union. Some of the states present at Belgrade insisted 
that public criticism of Mr. Khrushchev would not help stop nuclear 
tests, but only make Mr. Khrushchev's position within the Soviet 
hierarchy more difficult. They felt that if Mr. Khrushchev were to be 
overthrown, his replacement would be far worse in terms of peaceful 
coexistence. Thus for these strategic reasons they tried to prevent any 
sharp criticism of Mr. Khmhchev during the Conference (coming as it 
did only a few weeks before the 22nd congress of the Soviet Communist 
par9 5 
, The son-aligned Itates havs t k i r  own priorities of interest. To 
most of the inhabitants of the non-aligned world, the cold war is of 
little or no concern. Berlin and Germany are distant-geographically 
and psychologically. Their people have more immediate political and 
economic problems. For example, Mr. Nehru in a television program 
with Mr. Adlai Stevenson on November 12, 1961, attributed the lack 
of strong protests against Soviet tests to the fact that rhe newer nations 
of Africa are not personally involved. He suggested that the African 
nations are militant if there are tests in Africa, but tests in the Soviet 
Union are a long way away. Then Mr. Nehru added: "But the thing is 
the same, whether it is in Africa, Europe, or somewhere else." The fact 
remains that most of the non-aligned states are not as concerned about 
the line which divides the West from the Communist world as they 
are aboui that which divides the developed from the nondeveloped 
world. 
The non-aligned states are neatrat in the cold war for economic 
reasons. The ex-colonies are not by coincidence the present under- 
developed countries. By treading carefully, despite the cold war, and 
refusing ideological commitments, they have managed to begin the long 
process of economic and industrial development with billions of dollars 
and rubles of economic aid. In order not to jeopardize the continuance 
of this help from both ideological camps, they pay the political price 
of trying to maintain the status quo by maintaining an equidistance 
between the two blocs. Being more neutral than non-aligned, some of 
these nations may praise one bloc, or another, but they never criticize 
either to the point that they become aligned and thus would be cut off 
from economic aid from the other side. 
The non-digned states want to end the cold war, not help win it. 
They feel that they must talk softly to all nations, disagreeing with 
policies, but not attacking the great powers for purely propagandistic 
motives. If they spoke too critically, they would not-in the words of 
President T i t h t t b r i ng  about a relaxation of tension in the world, but 
would, on the contrary, add to the tension." This is a denial that they 
do possess a double standard. The non-aligned nations insist, however 
belatedly, that they would not have reacted dserently had the U.S. first 
resumed nuclear testing. They would also have disagreed with a US. 
resumption of explosions, but they insist that they would not have done 
so in a way which would have made the international climate worse. 
WAR AND DISARMAMENT 
"War has never threatened mankind with graver conse- 
quences than today. On the other hand, never before has 
mankind had at its disposal stronger forces for eliminating 
war as an insuument of policy in international relations." 
-Belgrade Declaration 
Prime Minister Nehru asserted that "nothing is more important 
or has more priority than this world situation of war and peace." His 
priority for the Belgrade Conference was adopted by the drafting 
committee and the heads of state. Quite independently most statesmen 
present automatically emphasized the worsening international situation. 
Mrs. Bandaranaike said rhat she attended the Conference "as a woman 
and a mother who can understand the thoughts and feelings of those 
millions of women, the mothers of the world, who are deeply concerned 
with the preservation of the human race." For this utterance, she received 
one of the rare applauses during the plenary sessions. She also stated 
that there is not a single mother "who could bear to contemplate the 
possible danger to her children of being exposed to atomic radiation 
and slow and lingering death, if not swift annihilation." She warned 
the statesmen of the world that they do not "have a mandate to pre- 
cipitate a nuclear war and immense destructive power either to defend a 
way of life or to extend a political ideology." Prime Minister U Nu 
felt that the cold war had taken a "sharp turn for the worse." There 
was a "palpable drift toward open conflict." Man today lives "his entire 
life in a fear-laden atmosphere," with a "nagging fear that every day 
may be the last for him and his family." Archbishop Makarios reflected 
that mankind is living "in the agony of what might happen tomorrow 
in the shadow of the dread of possible destruction under the menace of 
a new war." Because the means of total destruction have now been 
placed in the hands of man, "humanity will have to abolish war or 
perish." Prime Minister Nkrumah likewise warned that if war ever 
comes, "the missiles and rockets cannot be prevented from reaching us 
at our non-aligned doors." 
In addition to denouncing war, the heads of state tried to find 
means of eliminating it. They discussed the necessity of negotiation and 
of disarmament, quite apart from the special issues of nuclear weapons 
tests and of the role of foreign military bases. The principle of peaceful 
coexistence was also reaffirmed. 
The general impasse between the West and the Soviet Union, and 
the particular stalemate over Berlin, were discussed from many view- 
points. The necessity of negotiation was repeatedly underlined. President 
Nasser admitted that the Kennedy-Khrushchev talks in Vienna "did not 
achieve the objectives hoped for." Yet he added that "negotiations are 
essential and if they do not succeed we must try anew.*' He called 
negotiations the "only safe way in such a clouded atmosphere." And 
the heads of state in their Appeal for Peace urged the President of the 
U.S. and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to 
"make most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the 
imminent conflict and establish peace." 
The Conference also urged continued U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations 
"until both they and the rest of the world achieve total disarmament 
and enduring peace." The discussions about disarmament at Belgrade 
were more sophisticated than at previous Asian-African conferences, 
partly because the non-aligned states are devoting more attention to 
disarmament problems and partly because there has been more discussion 
of this issue recently on the world stage. Many disarmament ideas were 
aired. Prince Sihanouk suggested that disarmament control should "not 
be entrusted to the two great powers," but to a neutral commission 
composed of the non-aligned countries. President Nkrumah also said 
the inspection teams should be composed exclusively of non-aligned 
states since "it would eliminate all suspicion, create confidence in the 
inspection method, and help solve this crucial and vital issue." He urged 
that representatives from the non-aligned world be represented at all 
future disarmament conferences. President Tito called for a "new 
approach" to disarmament, one which involved the "broad and active 
participation of countries which have neither been involved in the arms 
race nor directly engaged in disarmament negotiations." He felt the time 
had come to convene a general world disarmament conference in an 
d o r t  to take the disarmament problem "off dead center." He also advo- 
cated initial and partial measures, but not as a substitute to complete 
disarmament which remained "the basic and increasingly urgent task." 
Mrs. Bandaranaike reminded the heads of state that she and the heads 
of Cyprus, Ghana, and India discussed disarmament at length at the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in March 1961 and she 
commended their communique on disarmament. 
One aspect of current Western military posture drew widespread 
criticism: foreign military bases. Prime Minister Daud called them 
"a threat to the peace of the world," especially those which "have been 
farced on the soil of people against their wishes." Prince Sihanouk 
declared that no country has the right to maintain a military base in a 
nation "in the face bf opposition from its legitimate Government." 
President Dorticos urged the dismantling and abolition of foreign bases, 
and said the U.S. base in Guantanamo was used "to wound our national 
dignity, to harbor counter-revolutionary forces, and to introduce arms 
inrb the country for use against the liberating forces of the Revolution." 
a A key to the foreign policies of many of the countries represented 
ar Belgrade &as the cohcept of peaceful coexistence. Prime Minister 
U Nu said: "We believe that man must learn to coexist, regardless of 
his differences, and that he must not be deterred or discouraged because 
of differences, because differences will exist as long as man lasts." 
Prince Sihanouk defined co-existence as "simply a renunciation of the 
use of force to impose an ideology." Coexistence should create a climate 
of confidence, relaxed tension, and friendship among all nations. The 
Belgrade Conference reflected this concern. It suggested that diflerent 
social systems do not constitute an "insurmountable obstacle for the 
stabilization of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference 
in the international development of other peoples and nations are ruled 
out." The Declaration pointedly asserted that "any attempt at imposing 
upon peoples one social or political system or another by force and from 
outside is a direct threat to world peace." This principle of co-existence 
is the "only alternative" to the continuance of the cold war and 
ultimately a nuclear catastrophe. 
BERLIN AND GERMANY 
"The countries participating in the Conference consider 
that the German problem is not merely a regional problem 
but liable to exercise a decisive influence on the course of 
future developments in international relations. Concerned 
at the develo~ments which have led to the bresent acute 
aggravation Gf the situation in regard to Germany and 
Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties 
concerned not to resort to or threaten the use of force to 
solve the German question or the problem of Berlin, in 
accordance with the appeal made by the Heads of State or 
Governments on 5 September, 1961 ." 
-Belgrade Decla~ation 
The Conference convened when the Berlin crisis was severe and 
thus many heads of state understandably emphasized Berlin and Germany 
in their speeches in the general debate. Some made general observations, 
while others presented specific solutions. Prime Minister U Nu, for 
example, deplored the military response of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
to the Berlin crisis, as if "the facts of nuclear warfare have not yet 
sunk in deep enough." What "shocked" him was that "the responses and 
counterresponses have been undisguisedly military in character." The 
willingness of the Great Powers to go to war if necessary over Berlin 
"represents a bankruptcy of common sense and reason." He asserted 
that "there is no problem in this world, however intractable, which 
cannot be solved by negotiations and without loss of honor to either 
side." 
Prime Minister Daud of Afghanistan urged that it was the duty 
of the non-aligned states to prevent war over Berlin by taking the 
initiative in bringing about negotiations. Several heads of state, including 
Emperor Haile Selassie and President Salam, suggested that the issue 
be taken directly to the U.N. Prime Minister Nehru spoke of the "two 
independent entities, powers, countries" of East and West Germany as 
"a fact of life." He added: "It is not a matter of my or anyone else's 
liking or disliking it; it is a fact that has to be recognized." President 
Sukarno declared: "Common sense demands the recognition of the 
temporary de fact0 sovereignty of two Germanies as a big reality." 
Several heads of state mentioned the reality of the Oder-Neisse line. 
Thus President Nkrumah. observed: "The Oder-Neisse Frontier which 
emerged from the last war should be respected." 
Access to West Berlin was discussed. Emperor Haile Selassie sup- 
ported-the concept of "free access to West Berlin." President Nkrumah, 
in Belgrade after an extensive visit to the Soviet Union and China, 
asserted that access to West Berlin "has been guaranteed over and 
over again by those who have authority to give such a guarantee." Prime 
Minister Nehru was "glad that Mr. Khmshchev himself indicated that 
such access "will not be limited." He felt that "if that is made perfectly 
clear and guaranteed by all concerned . . . one of the major fears and 
major causes of conflict will be removed." President Sukarno observed 
that "the people of West Berlin should have free access to the other 
part of the world and the people of the world should also have free 
access to West Berlin." 
Other solutions to the German problem were also proposed. 
Several speakers talked of the reunification of Germany. Thus Prince 
Sihanouk urged reunification "on the express condition that it remain 
neutral." Also the concept of self-determination was suggested. Arch- 
bishop Makarios said: "Any solution of the problem of Germany should 
not disregard the will of the German people whose right to determine 
freely their status and future cannot be denied." He felt that "any 
negotiations for the solution of the Berlin crisis and of the German 
problem in general must be based on the will of the German people 
freely expressed." He suggested that the "Germans themselves decide 
through a plebiscite under the auspices of the U.N. their form and 
system of government and as to whether Germany should be united or 
remain divided." President Sukarno urged that "the Germans themselves 
decide their future destiny." And President Salam declared that a 
permanent solution to the Berlin situation can be found if the German 
people are permitted to exercise their fundamental right to self- 
determination." 
President Dorticos advocated "the immediate signature of a peace 
treaty which would confirm the frontiers of Germany as they were 
established at Potsdam." President Tito urged negotiations toward "at 
least a provisional solution, which would not prejudge a final settlement 
to be achieved later." 
With the specter of nuclear war over Berlin hanging above the 
Conference, and the advocacy of many different solutions, the drafting 
committee faced a difficult decision. Should it merely ask the U.S. and 
the U.S.S.R. to negotiate or should it suggest the lines of negotiation? 
A number of members of the Committee urged that a strong paragraph 
be put into the Declaration, at least acknowledging the existence of the 
two German states and the necessity of not changing the Oder-Neisse 
line. The Indian delegation, however, felt that specific recommendations 
from the Conference would not aid negotiations. Prime Minister Nehru 
in the general debate warned: "We may have our ideas, and when the 
time comes we may even say so, but our indicating 'these are the lines 
for your settlement, for negotiation,' instead of helping may hinder, 
because we are dealing with proud nations and they may react wrongly." 
He added: "Therefore, we cannot really lay down any terms on which 
they should negotiate; but it is our duty and function to say that they 
must negotiate, and any party that does not do so does tremendous 
injury to the human race." In maintaining this position, the Indians in 
the drafting committee not only had the support of the Southeast Asians 
(except the Indonesians), but they also had the vote of the Arab states, 
including the U.A.R. The rather mild statement in the Declaration on 
Berlin and Germany had this origin and reportedly was adopted in the 
drafting committee by a vote of 15 to 9. 
COLONIALISM AND NEO-COLONIALISM 
"In so far as any historical perspective is concerned, the 
era of classic colonialism is gone and is dead, though of 
course it survives and gives a lot of trouble yet; but essen- 
tially it is over."-Prime Misister Nehrre 
During his speech in the general debate, Prime Minister Nehru 
turned the Belgrade Conference from a traditional gathering of the 
ex-colonial nations into one perhaps primarily devoted to reducing world 
tensions. In the preparatory meetings, the Indians and others made the 
point that there was no need to convene a meeting of busy heads of 
state just to discuss regional issues, such as Goa, West Irian, or Guan- 
tanamo. These problems would be inevitably solved, perhaps at the 
United Nations. Yet most heads of state nevertheless came to Belgrade 
eager to discuss and document their favorite colonial theme. Thus Prime 
Minister Nehru astounded his peers by suggesting that "there is a time 
and a place to press any subject and today the time and the place and 
the occasion are here to take up this question of war and peace." He 
acknowledged that they all "stand for anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, 
anti-racialism, and all that." He added that these goals "may be very 
important but they are secondary." While Mr. Nehru won his battle 
for a separate statement on Big Power negotiations, the twin evils of 
colonialism and racism were heatedly debated. And a new evil was 
added-neo-colonialism. 
If the traditional emphasis on anti-colonialism was softened by the 
decision that it did not have top priority of importance, anti-imperialism 
in its many forms still took high priority in debate, especially in the 
drafting committee. There were two contentious issues: whether or not 
a date should be set for the ending of colonialism and whether or 
not Israel should be castigated as a colonial center of imperialism in 
West Asia. 
The President of Cuba in the general debate was among those who 
urged that the Conference set a date for the "end of colonialism, within 
a fired period." President Nkrumah proposed that "by 31st December, 
1962, all Colonial powers should withdraw from Africa." President 
Sukarno demanded "that a time limit be imposed for the complete 
removal of all forms of colonial subjugation of one nation by the other." 
He felt that "in the case of every remaining colonial regime, that time 
limit must not exceed two years, and must, if possible, be less than 
that." President Tito also called for 'precisely defined target dates" for 
the implementation of the U.N. anti-colonial resolution. After much 
debate, this recommendation was approved by a narrow vote in the 
drafting committee. In the penultimate plenary session, however, the 
heads of state deleted the date. Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister 
U Nu, and others felt that a uniform date would be impracticable. 
They did, however, support the U.N. resolution granting independence 
to colonial countries and recommended "the immediate, unconditional, 
total, and final abolition of colonialism . . . in all its forms and mani- 
festations." 
There was a similar debate in the drafting committee on a para- 
graph about Israel. Some of the heads of state wanted a strong indict- 
ment of Israel in the Declaration. Prime Minister U Nu was chiefly 
responsible for softening the initial statement by threatening to object 
to  the final Declaration. While several heads of state sharply criticized 
Israel in the general debate, the Declaration blandly condemned "the 
imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support 
for the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine 
i n  conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations." 
The continuing war in Algeria was high in the thoughts of all 
#delegates, especially since Prime Minister Ben Khedda of Algeria was 
present. He was accompanied by many of his diplomatic associates and 
found the Conference a fertile environment for political achievement. 
The Prime Minister of Afghanistan in his speech in the general debate 
announced "our official recognition" of the Provisional Government of 
Algeria. At the 15th plenary session, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia 
revealed that his government would grant de jure recognition to the 
Provisional Government of Algeria. This stimulated both President Tito 
and President Nkrurnah also to announce de jure recognition. 
The action of the French at Bizerte was, next to Algeria, in the 
minds of all present, and this led to a general discussion of what has 
been called neo-colonialism. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan ex- 
plained that "although colonialism is being forced to withdraw, it still 
seeks through intrigue and deception to retain its self-interest in other 
forms and shapes." Prince Sihanouk referred to "certain countries which 
have never lost their independence" but are "in fact under severe 
economic subjection and consequently are not at liberty to pursue their 
political life in accordance with their own wishes and interests." He 
urged that they be liberated with "fraternal assistance" from the non- 
aligned states since they "belong in fact to o w  non-committed world." 
Emperor Haile Selassie observed that "colonialism, defined in the classic 
sense, is forever finished, both in Africa and in Asia," but he urged 
his fellow heads of state to "recognize and deal with the attempts being 
made from all quarters to perpetrate colonial exploitation under new 
forms and to introduce into our continents new systems no less inimical 
to freedom and liberty." President Dorticos stated "new methods for 
exploitation of peoples are being developed by means of the economic, 
political, and military penetration of neo-colonialism." He talked of 
"client's sovereignty" and "a pretended economic aid which cripples 
national development and lays down political conditions." These are 
"odious forms of that neo-colonialism which today throws a threatening 
shadow over the Afro-Asian countries." 
Undoubtedly the problem of neo-colonialism was discussed more 
at Belgrade than at similar conferences and this discussion is reflected 
in the Declaration. Of the several sections devoted to this topic, one 
key paragraph asserts: "All nations have the right of unity, self- 
determination, and independence by virtue of which right they can 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, 
and cultural development without intimidation or hindrance." 
The savage repression of Angolans by Portugal was discussed by 
most heads of state. Roberto Holden, head of the Union of the Peoples 
of Angola, listened in the gallery. The Declaration contained a special 
paragraph on Angola, urging "a free and independent state without 
delay." 
Apartheid was denounced, but without the adoption of any concrete 
proposals for its elimination. However, there was determination that 
a new kind of racism should not develop elsewhere. Prime Minister 
U Nu hoped the non-aligned states would "resist any temptation to 
brand all the white races as evil merely because their particular rulers 
happen to be white." If they did, they would make "a tragic division 
of the world on the basis of color." He urged that, in combating evil, 
they "need to have both a large heart and a level head." Prince Sihanouk 
likewise urged that they eradicate from their mind "all traces of that 
racialism of which we are not guiltless." He hoped the Conference would 
issue a resolution "solemnly proclaiming the right of ethnic or religious 
minorities to treatment on an equal footing with the people among 
which they live." He asked that they "take care not to let past humilia- 
tions develop today into an anti-white racialism which would be as 
deplorable as the anti-black or anti-yellow racialism of the past." 
The relationship of the U.S. to Cuba elicited comment in the general 
debate and in the drafting committee. The President of Cuba drew a 
long indictment of the "imperialist conduct of the U.S. Government 
towards the struggle for national liberation of the Cuban people." He 
also urged that the "colonialist domination in Puerto Rico be condemned." 
Not many heads of state referred to the Cuba situation, although 
President Tito said the "best illustration of how deeply ingrained are 
the aspirations of the people to liberate themselves from all elements of 
colonial and semi-colonial dependence is provided by the recent attempt 
at aggressive intervention in Cuba, where the whole people unanimously 
rose in arms to oppose it." President Dorticos was able to include two 
references to Cuba in the final Declaration. 
THE UNITED NATIONS 
"The participating countries consider it essential that the 
General Assembly of the U.N. should, through the revision 
of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding 
the membership of the Security Council and of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council in order to bring the composi- 
tion and work of these two most important organs of 
the General Assembly into harmon with the needs of the d Organization and with the expan ed membership of the 
U.N. The unity of the World Organization and the assur- 
ing of the efficiency of its work make it absolutely neces- 
sary to evolve a more appropriate structure for the Secre- 
tariat of the U.N., bearing in mind equitable regional 
distribution. Those of the countries participating in the 
Conference who recognize the Government of the People's 
Republic of China recommend that the General Assembly 
in i ts  forthcoming Session should accept the representa- 
tives of the Government of the People's Republic of China 
as the only legitimate representativis of t h 2  country in the 
U.N."-Belgrade DecIrwation 
The heads of state in their speeches in the general debate supported 
the U.N., generally denounced the Russian proposal for a troika, and 
made moderate suggestions for strengthening the U.N. and giving it 
greater effectiveness. President Bourguiba called the U.N. "in spite of 
its imperfections . . . the great hope of mankind . . . the instrument 
without which the law of the jungle would prevail." President Tito 
suggested that "the weakening of the U.N. would have an extremely 
negative effect upon the general development of international relations." 
Several speakers reflected the special value of the U.N. to the 
smaller countries. Prime Minister U Nu said: "We believe that this 
need (for the U.N.) is greater for the smaller, weaker countries than 
for the big, powerful ones." He added that it would be "a black day 
indeed for the world, and particularly for the smaller countries, if the 
U.N. were to sufFer the fate of the League of Nations." Emperor Haile 
Selassie of Ethiopia, whose history was so bound up with the League, 
poignantly spoke of the "supreme importance which we, and particularly 
the smaller nations among us, must continue to attach to the role 
played by the U.N. in the field of international relations." He also said 
that "it is not the great powers that need or benefit from the existence 
of the U.N.; it is the small powers, which depend on and require and 
demand that it live." He added knowingly: "It is we who have the most 
to lose should it one day be relegated to a tidy niche in history, a niche 
already occupied by the League of Nations." 
Several statesmen condemned those states which bypassed the U.N. 
Thus President Tito suggested that it is "essential to wage a resolute 
fight against all tendencies to bypass and weaken the Organization and 
to distort its role." The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government 
of Algeria discussed "the attitude of contempt towards the U.N. shown 
by certain States-France in particular--an attitude adopted with an 
assurance of impunity." He felt it resulted in the diminution of the 
UN.'s prestige and authority. Prime Minister U Nu expressed "concern 
at the attitude adopted towards the U.N. by some of the Great Powers, 
since it goes without saying that the U.N. would be no U.N. without 
the participation of the Great Powers." Emperor Haile Selassie recalled 
how "the great powers, while prepared to use the U.N. when it suits 
their convenience, have been equally willing to ignore and bypass it and 
act independently of it when their interest so dictated." 
The proposals for enhancing the U.N. were both general and 
specific. Archbishop Makarios urged that the U.N. be "helped in its 
evolution towards becoming an effective instrument of governments for 
peace based on world law." The King of Nepal hoped that the U.N. 
would ''grow in such a manner as would inspire the coddence of 
(small) nations." The President of Somalia asserted that the U.N. 
"deserves our full support" and he paid tribute "to the colossal and 
marvellous results achieved by the U.N. in the Congo under the most 
dif5cult conditions imaginable." The King of Morocco called for charter 
review: the convening "of a general conference of all states members 
of the organization with a view to undertaking a full and comprehensive 
revision of the Charter." 
There were repeated suggestions that the People's Republic of 
China be allowed to take her place in the U.N. Prime Minister U Nu 
said that "this refusal to accept one of the major political facts of life 
of today's world has been a serious source of weakness to the U.N. as 
a world organization." Prime Minister Bandaranaike hoped that "wise 
counsels will prevail and China will take her legitimate seat in the 
U.N." President Dorticos said the China problem at the U.N. "does not 
admit of spurious temporary solutions, such as the proposal that the 
lawful government of China should be represented in the U.N. side by 
side with that of Formosa." Emperor Haile Selassie complained of 
hundreds of millions of Chinese unrepresented at the UN. President 
Nkrumah spoke of the "anomaly of China's exclusion." 
Many heads of state discussed Russia's proposals for changing the 
character of the secretariat. Only the President of Cuba supported the 
Soviet suggestion. He said: "We must acknowledge that the Secretariat 
should no longer remain under the control of a single individual, whose 
assumed neutrality-as has been shown by events in the Congo and by 
the murder of Lumumba--does not offer any guarantee that the Organi- 
zation's executive powers will be properly used." President Nkrumah 
felt the present organization of the Secretariat "outmoded," especially 
because of the tragic experiences in the Congo. He proposed a troika 
of deputies and also an executive body elected by the General Assembly 
"to ensure that the decisions of both the General Assembly and the 
Security Council would be faithfully and promptly implemented by 
the Secretariat." President Sukarno said the structure "requires reor- 
ganization." 
Other heads of state upheld the concept of a single executive and 
some specifically criticized Russia's intrusion of the troika. Prime 
Minister U Nu spoke of being "disturbed by the attitude adopted by 
the Soviet Union towards the U.N. because she finds herself in disagree- 
ment with some decisions taken by the world organization." He felt 
the troika would "seriously impair the value and effectiveness of the 
organization." He hoped the Soviet Union "would not press this matter." 
Prime Minister Bandaranaike specifically criticized the troika and the 
triumvirate of deputies, saying: "We feel that the Secretary-General 
should retain sole executive authority for carrying out the directives of 
the General Assembly, and Security Council, and the other bodies of 
the UN." The King of Nepal called the troika "clearly unworkable." 
The President of Somalia felt there are "no grounds for altering the 
structure" of the U.N. without destroying its effectiveness. He called for 
every effort "to resist any deviation from the principle of an independent 
International Civil Service." President Bourguiba favored "a strong 
Secretary-General invested with powers of interpretation and enforce- 
ment." President Tito suggested that a certain revision of the Secretariat 
might be helpful, but 'hot in a way which would amount to a freezing 
of present divisions in the world." 
It remained for Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Congo to say the 
last informed word on this topic: "In regard to the problem of the 
U.N. Secretary and the proposals that he should be replaced by a three- 
member committee, we hold that the Congolese experience provides an 
important argument against such proposals. Really, the power of veto, 
used by any member of such a triumvirate, would undermine every 
practical decision and would reduce the executive functions of the 
Organization to ineffectiveness without precedent." 
AN EVALUATION 
"The Conference may be proud of the fact that it has not 
fulfilled the expectations of the bad prophets." 
-King Hassan 1? 
Any evaluation of the Belgrade Conference must include an 
enumeration of both its achievements and its disappointments. While 
a preliminary weighing of these against each other can be done today, 
the ultimate evaluation can only be made by history. 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
The principal achievement of the Belgrade Conference was its 
effort to induce President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev to help 
turn the world away from war and toward negotiations. Prime Minister 
Nehru was influential in urging the heads of state at Belgrade to give 
highest priority to peace-making, saying the world situation was "by far 
the most dangerous that has arisen in the last 15 years or so since the 
last war ended." Thus there were repeated discussions on war and peace 
in the general debate and extensive considerations in the drafting com- 
mittee and in the closed plenary sessions on the best approach to the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Conference discussed and approved an 
Appeal for Peace. The day after the Conference formally adjourned, 
a committee of eight heads of state composed identical letters to Presi- 
dent Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. These letters were followed by 
discussions with Mr. Khrushchev in Moscow by Prime Minister Nehru 
and President Nkrumah and with Mr. Kennedy in Washington by 
President Sukarno and President Keita. While it is hard to evaluate the 
results of these activities, both President Kennedy and Premier 
Khrushchev felt it important to respond in full to these visits and 
communications. (See d e m e n t s  in Appendix). 
A second achievement of Belgrade was to identify and enhance 
the non-aligned position in the world. The Bandung p r i n c i p l ~ o n t i -  
nental afliliation-has become increasingly unsatisfactory, although the 
Asian-African caucussing group formed after the Bandung Conference 
has had a significant influence at the U.N. Yet the 29 Bandung nations 
covered too broad a political spectrum (e.g., People's Republic of China 
to Turkey). At the same time the Bandung formula was geographically 
limiting, with Europe and even Latin America excluded. Under the 
Belgrade formula, non-alignment is a position if not a force which is 
potentially universal. It is no longer bound by continent and color, 
with the admittance of Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and Cuba into the group. 
While the aligned states in Asia, such as the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Turkey have been excluded, it is expected that additional states will 
gravitate to the Belgrade "no bloc." Inevitably some states will leave 
as their policies in the U.N. and elsewhere become more aligned either 
toward the Soviet Union or the West. 
The third achievement of Belgrade was to underline the multiple 
and continuing concerns of the 25 nations for a variety of common goals. 
They demanded that the U.N. continue, not in a weaker form, but 
stronger. They underlined the importance of disarmament. They showed 
the need for economic development. And they emphasized the huge 
areas of remaining colonialism as well as the dangers of neo-colonialism. 
The Conference held high these issues and asked for their continued 
priority on the world's agenda, including that of the U.N. 
DISAPPOINTMENTS 
If there were achievements at Belgrade, there were also disappoint- 
ments. The chief one was, of course, the double standard displayed 
especially on the issue of the resumption of nuclear weapons tests but 
also on Communist colonialism. A discussion of the Belgrade reaction 
to the nuclear test issue is discussed at length elsewhere (p. 15).  
That the Conference did not discuss Communist penetration of Tibet 
and the continued Communist occupation of the Eastern European 
countries, such as Hungary, are indications that most of the nations 
present at Belgrade still refuse to recognize that colonialism and im- 
perialism can derive from other than Western and capitalistic sources. 
A second disappointment was the refusal of the Conference 
Declaration to deal with the Berlin and German problem except to call 
upon all parties not to use or threaten force. While a judgment on 
Berlin or Germany from basically a Communist viewpoint would have 
been disastrous and embarrassing for the Conference, a judgment of at 
least the minimum facts about Berlin and Germany would have been 
valuable. Such a statement by the Conference early in September 1961 
would have been a timely contribution to world discussion when there 
was so much unreality about the Berlin and German problem. By not 
saying anything more about Berlin than what appeared in the Declara- 
tion, the heads of state lost an important opportunity to give prudent 
leadership to help solve a crucial problem. 
A third disappointment was the absence at Belgrade of some states 
which were expected to attend. The Bandung Conference consisted of 
27 independent nations. Certainly after the birth of so many African 
states since 1955, one would expect many more than the 24 independent 
nations which appeared at Belgrade, even if some of the original 
Bandung nations could not be invited because of their political align- 
ments. The absence of otherwise eligible states was due in some cases 
to unfortunate decisions by the preparatory meetings in Cairo and 
in others to belated invitations which some of the heads of state invited 
felt they had to reject under the circumstances. The absence of some 
states was due to their own wish not to be aligned even with the non- 
aligned! It is expected that many additional states will attend any 
second conference. Yet at Belgrade such important non-aligned states 
as Nigeria, Togo, and Tanganyika (the latter nearer to independence in 
September 1961 than Algeria) were conspicuously and unfortunately 
absent. 
A final disappointment lay in the problems evidenced in even the 
non-aligned states themselves. Below the unity there was considerable 
disunity. There tended to be continuing commitments among the "non- 
committed" to the right (Cyprus, Nepal) and to the left (Cuba, 
Yugoslavia). A polarization developed on several occasions between 
the Casablanca group (Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, U.A.R. 
and the Provisional Government of Algeria) and the Southeast Asia 
group (India, Burma, and Ceylon, but not Indonesia). In addition, 
there were the usual personality conflicts and power struggles. Regional 
disagreements also intruded, such as the border dispute between Ethiopia 
and Somalia. Despite these disappointing divisions, the unity was still 
impressive, especially at a first meeting of the group. 
WHO WON AT BELGRADE? 
"We look forward to continued friendly relations with 
the Government and peoples participating in the Belgrade 
meeting."-Pre~ident Kemdy,  Sept. 13, 1961 
"It is gratifying that the views of the Soviet Government 
on the obtaining world situation coincide in 'many re- 
spects with the considerations set forth in the letter from 
the Conference participants." 
-Premier Khr~cshcheu, Sept. 16, 1961 
Although the Belgrade Conference was confined to non-aligned 
states, the two great power blocs watched the Conference closely. And 
the question has frequently been asked, who won at Belgrade? 
There was widespread initial disappointment with the Belgrade 
Conference in official and nongovernmental circles in the West. Many 
considered the Conference a stunning "defeat" for the U.S. Yet 
originally official US. policy toward the Belgrade Conference was 
opposite of that toward the Bandung Conference. In 1955, Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles tried to persuade America's allies in Asia 
(e.g., the Philippines and Turkey) not to accept an invitation to attend 
the Bandung Conference. He was unsuccessful, but he persuaded Presi- 
dent Eisenhower not to send a message of greetings to Bandung. During 
the intervening six years, U.S. policy changed and Mr. Dulles' dictum 
that neutrality is immoral was abandoned, both in the closing months 
of the Eisenhower Administration and in the early period of the 
Kennedy Administration. 
If the Kemedy Administration did not exactly welcome the Bel- 
grade Conference, it certainly "prepared for it. American ambassadors 
to nations attending the Conference were asked to brief the foreign 
officers on the status of the Geneva test-ban negotiations. President 
Kennedy even sent Ambassador Arthur Dean back to Geneva (after an 
absence-of two months) with new proposals in an dfon to show the 
Belgrade Conference that the US. was seriously perming the test-ban 
negotiations. While at least two U.S. ambassadors urged nations invited 
to Belgrade not to attend, their actions were officially repudiated by the 
State Department. The official policy was one of hope, if not enthusiasm, 
toward the Conference. 
Despite conflicting advice from his ambassadors to non-aligned 
states, President Kennedy announced at a press conference that he was 
cabling the following greeting to the Conference: "It is always 
encouraging when responsible world leaders join together to con- 
sider the problems that beset mankind. We recognize that most of 
the countries at Belgrade do not consider themselves committed on 
certain issues which confront us today, but we do know that they are 
committed to the U.N. Charter. The people of the U.S. share this 
commitment. W e  know that those gathering in Belgrade are committed 
to finding a way to halt the waste of the earth's resources in the building 
of the implements of death and destruction, and the people of the U.S. 
have constantly pledged themselves to this goal. We  believe that the 
peoples represented at this conference are committed to a world society 
in which men have the right and the freedom to determine their own 
destiny, a world in which one people is not enslaved by the other, in 
which the powerful do not devour the weak. The American people 
share that commitment, and we have pledged the influence of this 
nation to the abolition of exploitation in all of its forms. The peoples 
represented at Belgrade are committed to achieving a world at peace in 
which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and 
economic systems and to live their own way of life, and since our 
earliest beginnings this nation has shared that commitment. All this and 
much more the leaders at Belgrade have in common. This and much 
more the people of the U.S. have in common with them. So for myself 
and I'm sure for the American people I express the hope that their 
deliberations there will bring us all nearer these goals." 
American hopes for signs of approval by the Belgrade Conference 
of some of its official policies were heightened by the announcement 
of the resumption of nuclear tests by Russia. Just what the Kennedy 
Administration expected the heads of state at Belgrade individually or 
collectively to do in response to the Russian announcement is unclear. 
Probably it was hoped that the delegates at Belgrade would pause from 
their deliberations and issue a rhetorical blast at the Russians equal to 
the nuclear blast of the Russians. Instead, the Conference continued its 
work as scheduled, despite the great uneasiness caused by the Russian 
announcement. Many heads of state modified their prepared addresses 
to refer to the Russian announcement and the Conference Declaration 
contained a modest paragraph on nuclear tests. There was, however, no 
reprimand to the Soviet Union. The mild reaction to the Russian tests 
immediately prevented most Americans from perceiving any other 
accomplishments of the Conference. This reflex set in motion a train 
of second-thoughts about Belgrade, non-alignment, and the U.S. position 
toward the countries represented at Belgrade. 
While the Conference was still in session, President Kennedy had 
occasion to sign the foreign aid bill and he expressly appended this 
sentence: "It is my belief that in the administration of these funds we 
should give great attention and consideration to those nations who 
have our view of the world." Also there were reports from Washington 
that continued U.S. economic and agricultural aid to Yugoslavia and 
economic aid to the Volta River project in Ghana were being recon- 
sidered because of the deportment of the presidents of these two states 
at the Belgrade Conference. It has also been suggested that the President 
resumed American nuclear tests in reaction to the Belgrade Conference. 
Had the resumption of Soviet tests been criticized, the US. Govern- 
ment would have been more sensitive to non-aligned opinion. 
Just how anti-American (or anti-West) was the Belgrade Con- 
ference? The President of Cuba made some sharp statements during the 
general debate on the relationship of the U.S. to Cuba (and Puerto 
Rico) and on America's lack of hospitality to non-white delegates at 
the U.N. On his insistence, the Belgrade Declaration contained a 
paragraph on the U.S. military base at Guantanamo. Otherwise, there 
was nothing explicitly anti-American at the Conference. The Declaration 
did endorse policies-such as the seating of the People's Republic of 
China in the U.N.-which had long been opposed by the U.S. and 
favored by the U.S.S.R. But such action by the Conference cannot be 
considered anti-American any more than the attacks on some of 
America's closest NATO allies-France and Portugal-for their colonial 
and neo-colonial activities in Africa. 
If disenchantment with Belgrade developed in the U.S., there 
curiously developed enchantment in the U.S.S.R. In 1955 the Soviet 
Union welcomed the convening of the Bandung Conference and has 
since tried to make use of the Bandung mistique. For one thing, the 
U.S.S.R. had hoped for the convening of a second Bandung Conference 
which would not only include the People's Republic of China, but 
probably herself, since she is partly an Asian power. The Slgrade 
formula of non-alignment resulted in the exclusion of both China and 
the Soviet Union. Also the Russians were probably annoyed that 
Yugoslavia should have been selected as host for the Conference. Thus 
the Soviet press did not reflect any enthusiasm for Belgrade in the 
weeks before the Conference was held. It dispatched only nine reporters 
to Belgrade (the Chinese sent seven), but Chairman Khrushchev did 
cable an official message to the heads of state quite apart from his 
nuclear blast heralding its opening. He said in part: "Pursuing the lofty 
humanistic aims of ensuring peace and eliminating the remnants of 
the past war, the peace-loving states cannot but take measures to put 
out the remaining sources of war danger and curb the forces of aggres- 
sion and revenge.'' 
Somewhere in the midst of the Conference, the Soviet Union 
suddenly found that the meeting was not going as badly as she had 
feared. As the US. lost interest, the U.S.S.R. gained interest. But just 
how pro-Soviet was the Belgrade Conference? No head of state made 
any sharp statements against Soviet policy, but no head of state 
endorsed many of Russia's current political ideas either. No head of 
state directly praised Russia for resuming nuclear tests. Nobody endorsed 
her troika proposal, either for the U.N. or for the test-ban control 
body. While some heads of state advocated a deadline for the end of 
Western colonialism-as Russia had advocated-the Conference itself 
voted down any date. Again, while several heads of state tended to 
reflect the Russian position on Germany, and many advocated a com- 
promise position on Germany, the Conference itself took no substantive 
position on Germany and only pleaded for big power negotiations. 
The Conference did urge the admission of the People's Republic of 
China and changes in the United Nations, and it did make massive 
attacks on colonialism and neo-colonialism, but these are certainly not 
"Soviet" issues. The Soviet Union made negative gains at the Belgrade 
Conference: the Russian resumption of tests was not officially con- 
demned; neither was Communist colonialism in Hungary or Tibet. 
Thus the Belgrade Conference was only pro-Soviet in the sense that 
the Soviets tried belatedly to make it so and, in the attempt, they 
received the psychological help of many Americans. 
With the passage of time, the U.S. is having second thoughts 
about its initial reaction to the Belgrade Conference. Already both 
power blocs are trying to use the Belgrade mistique for their own 
ends. President Kennedy, speaking to the U.N. less than three weeks 
after the Conference ended, discussed the risks inherent in disarmament 
and said that they pale in comparison with the risks inherent in an 
unlimited arms race. Then he observed: "It is in this spirit that the 
recent Belgrade Conference-recognizing that this is no longer a Soviet 
problem or an American problem, but a human problem-endorsed a 
program of general, complete and strictly internationally controlled 
disarmament." One day later, on September 26, 1961, Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko, also speaking during the general debate 
of the 16th General Assembly, asserted that the wider international 
recognition given to the two German states, the stronger will be the 
foundations of peace in Europe. He then gave a nod to Belgrade when 
he added: "Many participants in the recent Belgrade Conference of 
non-aligned countries were quite justified in pointing out that the need 
for this is long since ripe." Mr. Gromyko also found it useful to appeal 
to the Belgrade powers, even if he had to echo several individual 
speeches and not the official Belgrade Declaration. 
Who won at Belgrade? The verdict of history may be that no bloc 
triumphed overwhelmingly, not even the non-aligned states themselves. 
DOCUMENT 1. Danger of War and Appeal for Peace. 
This Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non- 
Aligned Countries is deeply concerned that, even apart from already 
existing tensions, the grave and critical situation which, as never before, 
threatens the world with the imminent and ominous prospect of conflict, 
would almost certainly later develop into a World War. In this age of 
nuclear weapons and the accumulation of the power of mass destruction, 
such conflict and war would inevitably lead to devastation on a scale 
hitherto unknown, if not to world annihilation. 
This Conference considers that this calamity must be avoided, and 
it is therefore urgent and imperative that the parties concerned, and 
more particularly the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., 
should immediately suspend their recent war preparations and ap- 
proaches, take no steps that would aggravate or contribute to further 
deteriorations in the situation, and resume negotiation for a peaceful 
settlement of any outstanding differences between them with due regard 
to the principles of the United Nations Charter and continue negotiating 
until both they and the rest of the world achieve total disarmament and 
enduring peace. 
While decisions leading to war or peace at present rest with these 
great powers, the consequences affect the entire world. All nations and 
peoples have, therefore, an abiding concern and interest that the 
approaches and actions of the great powers should be such as to enable 
mankind to move forward to peace and prosperity and not to the doom 
of extinction. In the certain knowledge that they seek peace, this 
Conference appeals to the President of the United States of America 
and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to make 
most immediate and direct approaches to each other to avert the 
imminent conflict and establish peace. 
This Conference expresses the earnest hope that all nations not 
represented here, conscious of the extreme gravity of the situation 
will make a similar appeal to the leaders of the Powers concerned 
thereby proclaiming and promoting the desire and determination of 
all mankind to see the achievement of lasting peace and security for 
all nations. 
DOCUMENT 2. Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of 
Non-Aligned Countries. (The Belgrade Declaration.) 
The Conference of Heads of State or Government of the following 
non-aligned countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, 
Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, 
United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia and of the following coun- 
tries represented by observers: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador was held in 
Belgrade from September 1 to 6, 1361, for the purpose of exchanging 
views on international problems with a view to contributing more 
effectively to world peace and security and peaceful co-operation among 
peoples. 
The Heads of State or Government of the aforementioned countries 
have met at a moment when international events have taken a nun 
for the worse and when world peace is seriously threatened. Deeply 
concerned for the future of peace, voicing the aspirations of the vast 
majority of people of the world, aware that, in our time, no people and 
no government can or should abandon its responsibilities in regard to 
the safeguarding of world peace, the participating countries-having 
examined in detail, in an atmosphere of equality, sincerity and mutual 
confidence, the current state of international relations and trends pre- 
vailing in the present-day world-make the following declaration: 
The Heads of State or G o u e ~ m l t t  of Non-Aligned Cozcnt~ies, 
noting that there are crises that lead towards a world conflict in the 
transition from an old order based on domination to a new order based 
on cooperation between nations, founded on freedom, equality and 
social justice for the promotion of prosperity; consideri~g that the 
dynamic processes and forms of social change often result in or represent 
a conflict between the old established and the new emerging nationalist 
forces; con~idering that a lasting peace can be achieved only if this 
confrontation leads to a world where the domination of colonialism- 
imperialism and neo-colonialism in all their manifestations is radically 
eliminated; and recognizing the fact that acute emergencies threatening 
world peace now exist in this period of conflict in Africa, Asia, Europe 
and Latin America and big power rivalry likely to result in world con- 
flagration cannot be excluded; that to eradicate basically the source of 
conflict is to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept 
and practice a policy of peaceful coexistence in the world; that guided 
by these principles, the period of transition and conflict can lay a firm 
foundation of co-operation and brotherhood between nations; stute ths 
following: 
War has never threatened mankind with graver consequences than 
today. On the other hand, never before has mankind had at its disposal 
stronger forces for eliminating war as an instrument of policy in inter- 
national relations. 
Imperialism is weakening. Colonial empires and other forms of 
foreign oppression of peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are 
gradually disappearing from the stage of history. Great successes have 
been achieved in the struggle of many peoples for national independence 
and equality. In the same way, the peoples of Latin America are con- 
tinuing to make an increasingly effective conuibution to the improve- 
ment of international relations. Great social changes in the world are 
further promoting such a development. All this not only accelerates the 
end of the epoch of foreign oppression of peoples, but also makes 
peaceful co-operation among peoples, based on the principles of inde- 
pendence and equal rights, an essential condition for their freedom and 
progress. 
Tremendous progress has been achieved in the development of 
science, techniques and in the. means of economic development. 
Prompted by such developments in the world, the vast majority of 
people are becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that war between 
peoples constitutes not only an anachronism but also a crime against 
humanity. This awareness of peoples is becoming a great moral force, 
capable of exercising a vital influence on the development of interna- 
tional relations. 
Relying on this and on the will of their peoples, the Governments 
of countries participating in the Conference resolutely reject the view 
that war, including the "cold war," is inevitable, as this view reflects a 
sense both of helplessness and hopelessness and is contrary to the 
progress of the world. They &m their unwavering faith that the 
international community is able to organize its life without resorting 
to means which actually belong to a past epoch of human history. 
However, the existing military blocs, which are growing into more 
and more powerful military, economic and political groupings by the 
logic and nature of their mutual relations, necessarily provoke periodical 
aggravations of international relations. 
The cold war and the constant and acute danger of its being 
transformed into actual war have become a part of the situation prevail- 
ing in international relations. 
For all these reasons, the Heads of State and Representatives of 
Government of non-aligned countries wish, in this way, to draw the 
attention of the world community to the existing situation and to the 
necessity that all peoples should exert efforts to find a sure road towards 
the stabilization of peace. 
The present-day world is characterized by the existence of different 
social systems. The participating countries do not consider that these 
differences constitute an insurmountable obstacle for the stabilization 
of peace, provided attempts at domination and interference in the 
internal development of other peoples and nations are ruled out. 
All peoples and nations have to solve the problems of their own 
political, economic, social and cultural systems in accordance with their 
own conditions, needs and potentialities. 
Furthermore, any attempt at imposing upon peoples one social or 
political system or another by force and from outside is a direct threat 
to world peace. 
The participating countries consider that under such conditions the 
principles of peaceful coexistence are the only alternative to the "cold 
war" and to a possible general nuclear catasuophe. Therefore, these 
principles-which include the right of peoples to self-determination, 
to independence and to the free determination of the forms and methods 
of economic, social and cultural development-must be the only basis 
of all international relations. 
Active international cooperation in the fields of material and 
cultural exchanges among peoples is an essential means for the strength- 
ening of confidence in the possibility of peaceful coexistence among 
States with different social systems. 
The participants in the Conference emphasize, in this connection, 
that the policy of coexistence amounts to an active effort towards the 
elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national 
oppression, guaranteeing, at the same time, to every people their 
independent development. 
Aware that ideological differences are necessarily a part of the 
growth of the human society, the participating countries consider that 
peoples and Governments shall refrain from any use of ideologies for 
the purpose of waging cold war, exercising pressure, or imposing their 
will. 
The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries 
participating in the Conference are not making concrete proposals for 
the solution of d international disputes, and particularly disputes 
between the two blocs. They wish, above all, to draw attention to those 
acute problems of our time which must be solved rapidly, so that they 
should not lead to irreparable consequences. 
In this respect, they particularly emphasize the need for a great 
sense of responsibility and realism when undertaking the solution of 
various problems resulting from differences in social systems. 
The non-aligned countries represented at this Conference do not 
wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc. They sincerely desire to 
co-operate with any Government which seeks to contribute to the 
strengthening of confidence and peace in the world. 
The non-aligned countries wish to proceed in this manner all the 
more so as they are aware that peace and stability in the world depend, 
to a considerable extent, on the mutual relations of the Great Powers. 
Aware of this, the participants in the Conference consider it a 
matter of principle that the Great Powers take more determined action 
for the solving of various problems by means of negotiations, displaying 
at the same time the necessary constructive approach and readiness for 
reaching solutions which will be mutually acceptable and useful for 
world peace. 
The participants in the Conference consider that, under present 
conditions, the existence and the activities of non-aligned countries in 
the interests of peace are one of the more important factors for safe- 
guarding world peace. 
The participants in the Conference consider it essential that the 
non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding interna- 
tional issues concerning peace and securtiy in the world as none of them 
can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues. 
They consider that the further extension of the noncommitted 
area of the world constitutes the only possible and indispensable 
alternative to the policy of total division of the world into blocs, and 
intensification of cold war policies. The non-aligned countries provide 
encouragement and support to all peoples fighting for their independence 
and equality. 
The participants in the Conference are convinced that the 
emergence of newly-liberated countries will further assist in narrowing 
of the area of bloc antagonisms and thus encourage all tendencies aimed 
at strengthening peace and promoting peaceful co-operation among 
independent and equal nations. 
1. The participants in the Conference solemnly reaffirm their 
support to the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples," adopted at the 15th Session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and recommend the immediate uncon- 
ditional, total and final abolition of colonialism and resolve to make 
a concerted effort to put an end to all types of new colonialism and 
imperialist domination in all its forms and manifestations. 
2. The participants in the Conference demand that an immediate 
stop be put to armed action and repressive measures of any kind 
directed against dependent peoples to enable them to exercise peacefully 
and freely their right to complete independence and that the integrity 
of their national territory should be respected. Any aid given by any 
country to a colonial power in such suppression is contrary to the 
Charter of the United Nations. The participating countries respecting 
scrupulously the territorial integrity of all states oppose by all means 
any aims of annexation by other nations. 
3. The participating countries consider the struggle of the people 
of Algeria for freedom, self-determination and independence, and for 
the integrity of its national territory including the Sahara, to be just 
and necessary and are, therefore, determined to extend to the people 
of Algeria all the possible support and aid. The Heads of State or 
Government are particularly gratified that Algeria is represented at this 
Conference by its rightful representative, the Prime Minister of the 
Provisional Government of Algeria. 
4. The participating countries draw attention with great concern 
to the developments in Angola and to the intolerable measures of 
repression taken by the Portuguese colonial authorities against the 
people of Angola and demand that an immediate end should be put 
to any further shedding of blood of the Angolan people, and the people 
of Angola should be assisted by all peace-loving countries, particularly 
member states of the United Nations, to establish their free and inde- 
pendent state without delay. 
5. The participants in the Conference demand the immediate 
termination of all colonial occupation and the restoration of the 
territorial integrity to the rightful people in countries in which it has 
been violated in Asia, Africa and Latin America as well as the with- 
drawal of foreign forces from their national soil. 
6. The participating countries demand the immediate evacuation 
of French armed forces from the whole of the Tunisian territory in 
accordance with the legitimate right of Tunisia to the exercise of its 
full national sovereignty. 
7. The participating countries demand that the tragic events in 
the Congo must not be repeated and they feel that it is the duty of the 
world community to continue to do everything in its power in order 
to erase the consequences and to prevent any further foreign intervention 
in this young African state, and to enable the Congo to embark freely 
upon the road of its independent development based on respect for its 
sovereignty, unity and its territorial integrity. 
8. The participants in the Conference resolutely condemn the 
policy of apartheid practiced by the Union of South Africa and demand 
the immediate abandonment of this policy. They further state that the 
policy of racial discrimination anywhere in the world constitutes a 
grave violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
9. The participating countries declare solemnly the absolute respect 
of the rights of ethnic or religious minorities to be protected in par- 
ticular against crimes of genocide or any other violation of their 
fundamental human rights. 
10. The participants in the Conference condemn the imperialist 
policies pursued in the Middle East, and declare their support for the 
full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine in 
conformity with the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations. 
11. The participating countries consider the establishment and 
maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other coun- 
tries, particularly against their express will, a gross violation of the 
sovereignty of such States. They declare their full support to countries 
who are endeavoring to secure the vacation of these bases. They call 
upon those countries maintaining foreign bases to consider seriously 
their abolition as a contribution to world peace. 
12. They also acknowledge that the North American military 
base at Guantanamo, Cuba, to the permanence of which the Government 
and people of Cuba have expressed their opposition, affects the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country. 
13. The participants in the Conference reaffirm their conviction 
that: a) All nations have the right of unity, self-determination, and 
independence by virtue of which right they can determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development 
without intimidation or hindrance. b) All peoples may, for their own 
ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without 
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co- 
operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international 
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of sub- 
sistence. The participating countries believe that the right of Cuba as 
that of any other nation to freely choose their political and social 
systems in accordance with their own conditions, needs and possibilities 
should be respected. 
14. The participating countries express their determination that 
no intimidation, interference or intervention should be brought to bear 
in the exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples, including 
their right to pursue constructive and independent policies for the 
attainment and preservation of their sovereignty. 
15. The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament 
is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical 
solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the 
present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating 
countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and 
strictly and internationally controlled disarmament. 
16. The Heads of State or Government point out that general and 
complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, 
armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination 
of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes 
of internal security; and the total prohibition of the production, 
possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, 
bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of 
equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and opera- 
tional use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories. 
17. The participating countries call upon all States in general, 
and States exploring outer space at present in particular, to undertake 
to use outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They express the 
hope that the international community will, through collective action, 
establish an international agency with a view to promote and coordinate 
the human actions in the field of international cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of outer space. 
18. The participants in the Conference urge the Great Powers to 
sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament 
in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release 
energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the 
peaceful economic and social development of all mankind. The partici- 
pating countries also consider that: (a) The non-aligned Nations 
should be represented at all future world conferences on disarmament; 
(b) All discussions on disarmament should be held under the auspices 
of the United Nations; (c) General and complete disarmament should 
be guaranteed by an efFective system of inspection and control, the 
teams of which should include members of non-aligned Nations. 
19. The participants in the Conference consider it essential that 
an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests 
should be urgently concluded. With this aim in view, it is necessary 
that negotiations be immediately resumed, separately or as part of the 
negotiations on general disarmament. Meanwhile, the moratorium on 
the testing of all nuclear weapons should be resumed and observed by 
all countries. 
20. The participants in the Conference recommend that the 
General Assembly of the United Nations should, at its forthcoming 
session, adopt a decision on the convening either of a sp.ecia1 session 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to discussion 
of disarmament or on the convening of a world disarmament conference 
under the auspices of the United Nations with a view to setting in 
motion the process of general disarmament. 
21. The participants in the Conference consider that efforts should 
be made to remove economic imbalance inherited from colonialism and 
imperialism. They consider it necessary to close, through accelerated 
economic, industrial and agricultural development, the ever-widening 
gap in the standards of living between the few economically advanced 
countries and the many economically less-developed countries. The 
participants in the Conference recommend the immediate establishment 
and operation of a United Nations Capital Development Fund. They 
further agree to demand fair terms of trade for the economically less- 
developed countries and, in particular, constructive efforts to eliminate 
the excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and the restrictive 
measures and practices which adversely affect the trade and revenues 
of the newly-developing counuies. In general, they demand that the fruits 
of the scientific and technological revolution be applied in all fields of 
economic development to hasten the achievement of international social 
justice. 
22. The participating countries invite all the countries in the 
course of development to co-operate effectively in the economic and 
commercial fields so as to face the policies of pressure in the economic 
sphere, as well as the harmful results which may be created by the 
economic blocs of the industrial countries. They invite all the counuies 
concerned to consider to convene, as soon as possible, an international 
conference to discuss their common problems and to reach an agreement 
on the ways and means of repelling all damage which may hinder their 
development; and to discuss and agree upon the most dective measures 
to ensure the realization of their economic and social development. 
23. The countries participating in the Conference declare that the 
recipient countries must be free to determine the use of the economic 
and technical assistance which they receive, and to draw up their own 
plans and assign priorities in accordance with their needs. 
24. The participating countries consider it essential that the 
General Assembly of the United Nations should, through the revision 
of the Charter, find a solution to the question of expanding the member- 
ship of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council 
in order to bring the composition and work of these two most important 
organs of the General Assembly into harmony with the needs of the 
Organization and with the expanded membership of the United Nations. 
25. The unity of the World Organization and the assuring of 
the efficiency of its work make it absolutely necessary to evolve a more 
appropriate structure for the Secretariat of the United Nations, bearing 
in mind equitable regional distribution. 
26. Those of the countries participating in the Conference who 
recognize the Government of the People's Republic of China recommend 
that the General Assembly in its forthcoming Session should accept the 
representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China 
as the only legitimate representatives of that country in the United 
Nations. 
27. The countries participating in the Conference consider that 
the German problem is not merely a regional problem but liable to 
exercise a decisive influence on the course of future developments in 
international relations. Concerned at the developments which have led 
to the present acute aggravation of the situation in regard to Germany 
and Berlin, the participating countries call upon all parties concerned 
not to resort to or threaten the use of force to solve the German question 
or the problem of Berlin, in accordance with the appeal made by the 
Heads of State or Governments on September 6, 1961. 
The Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries 
resolve that this Declaration should be forwarded to the United Nations 
and brought to the attention of all the Member States of the World 
Organization. The present Declaration will be also forwarded to all 
the other States. 
DOCUMENT 3. Letter Addressed to President Kennedy (and Premier 
Khrushchev). 
Your Excellency, 
We, the Heads of States and Governments of our respective 
countries attending the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries held at 
Belgrade from September 1 to September 6, 1961, venture to address 
Your Excellency on a subject of vital and immediate importance to all 
of us and to the world as a whole. We do so not only on our own 
behalf, but at the unanimous desire of the Conference and of our 
peoples. 
We  are distressed and deeply concerned at the deterioration in the 
international situation and the prospect of war which now threatens 
humanity. Your Excellency has often pointed to the terrible nature of 
modern war and the use of nuclear weapons, which may well destroy 
humanity, and has pleaded for the maintenance of world peace. 
Yet we are at the brink of this very danger that menaces the world 
and humanity. We  are fully aware that Your Excellency is anxious as 
any of us to avoid this dreadful development which will not only end 
the hopes that we all have cherished for the advancement of our peoples 
but is a challenge to human survival. We  are certain that Your 
Excellency will do everything in your power to avert such a calamity. 
Having regard, however, to the gravity of the crisis that menaces 
the world and the urgent need to avert the developments that may 
precipitate it, we take the liberty of urging on the Great Powers 
concerned that negotiations should be resumed and pursued so that the 
danger of war might be removed from the world and mankind adopts 
ways of peace. In particular, we earnestly request for direct negotiations 
between Your Excellency and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,l who represent the two most 
powerful nations today and in whose hands lies the key to peace or 
war. We feel convinced that devoted as both of you are to world peace, 
your efforts through persistent negotiations will lead to a way out of 
the present impasse and enable the world and humanity to work and 
live for prosperity and peace. 
We  feel sure that Your Excellency will appreciate that this letter 
is written because of our love of peace and our horror of war and the 
compelling desire that a way out must be found before mankind is 
faced with a terrible disaster. 
We are sending a letter 'in identical terms to this to His Excellency, 
N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics.* 
With assurance of our deep regard, 
Yours sincerely? 
Belgrade, Septembev 6, 1961 
DOCUMENT 4. Letter from President John F. Kennedy to President 
Modibo Keita and President Sukarno. 
September 13,1961 
Dear Mr. President: 
I have studied with care the message from the conference of non- 
aligned nations which you were good enough to present in person. The 
United States Government is aware that the non-aligned powers 
assembled at Belgrade represent an important segment of world opinion, 
and, especially, that their peoples share with ours a vital stake in the 
maintenance of the peace. In our continuing deliberations within the 
United States Government and with our allies, we will give the message 
from the conference most careful consideration. 
1. In the letter to M,r. Khrushchev, the phrase is substituted, "and the Presi- 
dent of the United States. 
2. In the letter to Mr. Khrushchev, the phrase is substituted, "to His Ex- 
cellency Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America." 
3. The original draft of the letter was signed by Prime Minister Daud, 
Prime Minister Khedda, Prime Minister U Nu, Prince Sihanouk, Prime Minister 
Bandaranaike, Premier Adoula, President Dorticos, and President Makarios. It 
was drafted and signed on September 6, 1961, when some of the heads of state 
had already left Belgrade. A later draft of the letter was published signed by all 
heads of state or government or heads of delegations attending the Conference. 
As regards the proposal that I enter into direct negotiations with 
Premier Khrushchev, we are prepared to use existing and appropriate 
channels to establish the possibility of surmounting the present impasse. 
It has been and continues to be our policy to seek to settle our 
problems with others by peaceful means. W e  have not attempted to 
create crises, and we believe it is incumbent upon all responsible govern- 
ments to explore all possible avenues, including negotiations at the 
highest levels, for mutually acceptable solutions of current international 
problems. 
However, unless such negotiations are carefully prepared before- 
hand they risk failure and may lead to deterioration of the situation. 
We  therefore feel that at a time of great tension it is particularly 
necessary that negotiations of the kind proposed by the Belgrade Confer- 
ence not only have careful preparation but also a reasonable chance of 
success. . . . 
The channels of diplomacy are open for the exploration of con- 
structive steps toward a reduction of tension. Other means are available 
when they can serve a useful purpose. Meanwhile, it is clearly of the 
utmost importance that there be no unilateral acts which will make 
peaceful progress impossible. 
Given a realistic approach and a sincere desire on the other side 
as well as ours to reach a mutually acceptable solution, we see no reason 
why eventual negotiations should not be successful in coping with the 
present crisis. However, we do not intend to enter into negotiations 
under ultimata or threats. It is also clear that we do not propose to 
discuss either abdication of our responsibility or renunciation of the 
modalities for carrying out those responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, we believe it possible to find a solution which can 
accommodate vital interests on both sides of the crisis. 
The United States has carefully noted the statements in the Belgrade 
declaration recognizing that the Berlin and German situations are of 
vital importance to future developments in international relations. It 
has consistently been, and will continue to be, our policy to settle 
differences with realism and responsibility. 
We  would note that this crisis has been initiated by Soviet, not 
by American action. We  endorse the declaration's reference to the right 
of all nations to unity, self-determination, and independence, and its 
condemnation of intimidation, intervention, and interference in the 
exercise of the right of self-determination. W e  presume that these 
principles apply equally to the people of Germany and Berlin. 
Our policies in this area have sought to respect these principles. 
We  have absolutely no intention of resorting to force or threats of 
force to solve the Berlin and German problems, but we are determined 
to honor our commitments and are prepared to meet force with force 
if it is used against us. 
While the United States and its allies are all agreed there must 
be negotiations on the problem, the Soviet Union must give indication 
of a readiness to engage in discussion based on mutual respect. The 
only conditions it has yet exhibited any willingness to consider are 
conditions which involve the surrender of Western rights. 
The United States continues to believe that conclusion of an 
adequately controlled test ban agreement is a matter of greatest urgency. 
We wish to reafKrm, however, our belief that test ban negotiations 
should be resumed separately from negotiations on general and complete 
disarmament. The Soviet resumption of atmospheric testing has increased 
the urgency which attaches to the signature of a complete treaty test 
ban. Complex negotiation on general disarmament should not be 
permitted to delay the achievement of this significant step forward. 
I would emphasize again my regret that the Soviet Union has 
rejected the offer of the United Kingdom and the United States Gov- 
ernment to halt atmospheric tests creating fallout. 
Only after a searching review of vital United States security 
interests and after the utmost provocation did we announce our intention 
to resume underground tests. The non-aligned nations may be assured 
of our continued willingness to negotiate an effective treaty; but, 
meanwhile, the national security interests of our country and of our 
allies in the free world must be protected. . . . 
The United States is pleased to note that the participants in the 
recent conference in Belgrade mentioned the importance of an effective 
system of inspection and control. This is the crux of the matter. It is 
clear from United States proposals in the nuclear test negotiations 
that the United States contemplates inspection and control procedures 
in the disarmament field in which the non-aligned countries, as well 
as others, would participate. 
For some months the United States has been conducting an 
intensive study of the problem of general disarmament which resulted 
in a request to Congress to create a disarmament agency. The 
study has also resulted in the development of a comprehensive plan for 
general and complete disarmament which is in the final stage of 
preparations for public presentation. 
This plan provides for a program which will insure that the 
disarmament is general and complete; that war is no longer an instru- 
ment for settling international disputes; and that disarmament is 
accompanied by the creation of reliable procedures for peaceful settle- 
ment of disputes and maintenance of peace in accordance with the 
principles of the United Nations Charter. . . . 
Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed 
Sept. 6 in New York in a further effort to bring the two sides closer 
together and to work out a satisfactory disarmament forum. The 
proposals put forth by the United States by these talks provides for 
participation of non-aligned countries in future broad disarmament 
negotiations. They also provide for negotiations under the auspices of 
the United Nations if the Soviet Union will agree. . . . 
In conclusion, let me say, Mr. President, that we found elements 
in the message and in the declaration which reflected a genuine desire 
to bring about a relaxation of tensions and which, if applied in a truly 
neutral and objective manner, could be of positive benefit in easing 
world tensions. 
We respect, as always, the desire of other nations to remain non- 
aligned. We understand with sympathy and share their passion for 
peace. We are, as always, prepared to cooperate with all initiatives to 
bring about an improvement in the world situation. We look forward 
to continued friendly relations with the Government and peoples 
participating in the Belgrade meeting. 
DOCUMENT 5. Letter from Premier Khrushchev to Prime Minister 
Nehru. 
September 16, 1961 
Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister, 
I have studied with close attention and interest the letter from 
the recently ended conference of the heads of state and government 
of twenty-five non-aligned nations and I am deeply touched that you 
took the trouble to bring it to Moscow and deliver it to me in person. 
I express heartfelt gratitude to all distinguished Conference participants 
for this letter. It is gratifying that the views of the Soviet Government 
on the obtaining world situation coincide in many respects with the 
considerations set forth in the letter from the Conference participants. 
I was also favorably impressed by the other Conference documents full 
of concern for the destinies of the world. 
How can one fail to rejoice that the governments of neutral 
states, whose population comprises a third of mankind, have lifted their 
voice in defense of peace and resolutely denounce the policy of war 
preparations. This will be of the greater importance for world develop- 
ments since struggle to prevent war and consolidate peace was and 
remains the backbone of the entire foreign policy of the Socialist states, 
which compose another third of mankind. 
This is how broad the circle of states which regard concern for 
peace as their vital cause has become. 
The Conference's insistent call for the immediate conclusion of a 
treaty on general and complete disarmament will unquestionably attract 
the attention of all people. Yes, it is indeed the most pressing and urgent 
matter, as it is in it that we have a reliable key to stable peace on earth. 
The Soviet Government regards with great respect the Conference's 
considerations and conclusions on a number of other international 
questions, including the question of complete and final liquidation of 
colonialism. It can now be confidently said that soon, very soon, the 
pressure of joint forces of the peoples will break the resistance of states 
clinging to their colonial possessions which have served them for decades 
as a source of enrichment, but only because the colonialists robbed 
and brutally exploited the colonial peoples. The sweat and blood of 
these peoples-such is the source of the wealth of the colonial powers. 
The day is near when colonialism will be forever wiped off the face 
of the earth. 
In the letter delivered to me the Conference participants expressed 
deep concern over the aggravation of the international situation and the 
danger of war. The Soviet Government fully shares this concern. In all 
the postwar period the threat of war has never, perhaps, been felt as 
keenly as today. As you are well aware, of course, this state of affairs 
has not come of itself. It is a result of the activities of definite forces 
which are interested in anything but stable peace. 
One cannot escape the thought that the policy of the NATO 
powers is being increasingly influenced by circles which simply seek 
war, push to war. They apparently realize that time works against the 
old imperialist system founded on domination and oppression, on flout- 
ing the basic rights of the peoples, and are considering if the time 
has not come to stake everything on an attempt to stop by war the 
great shifts that are taking place in the life of the peoples throughout 
the world, and especially on the continents which only yesterday 
groaned under the whip of the colonial overseers. 
This conclusion imposes when you see that the governments of 
the Western powers intensify military preparations in every way, 
increase the already inflated military budgets, call up reservists, and 
instill among the population of their countries a spirit of militarism 
of which there is already too much in some NATO powers. It appears 
that these countries are not averse to using for a general showdown the 
central question which brooks no delay-the question of a German 
peace treaty whose conclusion would radically improve the situation in 
Europe considering the actual situation which has developed in Germany 
in connection with the formation of two sovereign German states, and 
would render a serious service to the cause of universal peace. . . . 
I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to declare that 
we are deeply convinced that the measures we have taken are in the 
interests not only of the Soviet people, of our allies, who like ourselves, 
defend the cause of peace, the need of drawing a line under World War 
I1 and concluding a German peace treaty for this purpose, but also in the 
interests of all other peoples who crave a peaceful life. We  express 
satisfaction with the fact that, on the whole, our defensive measures have 
been understood correctly by most broad public circles in many countries. 
I should like to tell you openly and frankly, although that will 
be no news to you, that the Soviet Union would not like to follow in 
the rut of military rivalry with the Western powers. This is not our 
policy, this is not our road and we should not like to follow along 
this road unless forced to do so. Our greatest and most sacred desire 
is to live in friendship with all states, to live in a world without wars. 
It is for this reason that we are demanding so persistently that statesmen 
responsible for the destinies of the world take the only correct decision: 
to put an end to remnants of the Second World War, to smash com- 
pletely the war machinery of states, destroy all armaments, including 
nuclear weapons which would finally remove the question of nuclear 
weapons tests; both of these questions are bound up organically, 
inseparably and can be solved only simultaneously. It is this that I tried 
to stress in every way during my recent meeting with President Kennedy 
in Vienna. 
In their letter the participants in the conference of noncommitted 
nations urge negotiations between the great powers to remove the 
danger of war. In particular they suggest direct talks between the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President 
of the United States of America. 
What can one say to that? You know, of course, that the Soviet 
Union always stood for a negotiated settlement of outstanding issues. 
Naturally now too we believe that talks between states, especially 
between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, as the mightiest,and most 
influential countries, can and must play an important role in cleansing 
the international atmosphere. In the name of insuring peace we are 
ready for talks any time, any place and at any level. 
The need has been ripe for a long time for statesmen of nations 
which fought against Hitler Germany to sit down at a peace conference 
table and together with representatives of both German states, in a calm 
atmosphere, without stirring up passions, work out a peace treaty which 
would quench the smouldering embers left after the world conflagration 
which raged a decade and a half ago. These do exist, and not just 
anywhere but in the center of Europe from which spread that con- 
flagration in whose flames tens of millions of people had perished. We, 
the Soviet people, better than anyone else know what this tragedy had 
cost and how many human lives it carried away. 
It goes without saying that negotiations on mature international 
problems are needed and we have said so on more than one occasion. 
But they are needed not for the negotiations' sake. Bitter experience 
has taught us to speak about this straight. Talks would be useful only 
if statesmen go to these talks with a serious desire and readiness to 
achieve agreements which would represent a basis for strengthening 
peace. The participants in the talks must have courage to face realities 
and clearly realize that no one can turn the tide of events which reflect 
the national development of human society. 
One has to speak about this because some Western leaders are not 
averse to striking attitudes even when most serious matters are at stake: 
'*Just look at us, how we do not let ourselves listen to reason." Is it not 
a fact that certain Western leaders keep interspersing their statements 
with utterances to the effect that they are holding tough positions and 
savor this word "tough" in every way? 
. . . I want you to get me right. The Soviet Government is ready to 
take part in negotiations which would be really aimed toward the 
speediest solution of pressing international problems, in the fist  turn 
in a peace conference on the question of concluding of a German peace 
treaty and normalizing the situation in West Berlin on this basis. It is 
convinced that the sooner such serious negotiations start the better it 
would be. It would be an expression of great statesmanship if such a 
treaty was concluded on an agreed basis at the earliest date. 
To strengthen peace and normalize the situation in Europe and 
throughout the world it would be a good thing if other countries which 
have not recognized yet both German states-the German Democratic 
Republic {East Germany] and the Federal Republic of Germany-would 
recognize them de jure, establish relations with them. The admission 
of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of 
Germany to the United Nations would serve the same purpose. 
AlI this would raise a serious barrier to revenge-seeking circles 
in West Germany which, as it is known, are rallying forces to change 
the conditions which have arisen after World War 11. 
The entry of both German states into the United Nations and the 
establishment of relations with them would fix the situation which exists 
in Germany and that would be a great contribution to the cause of 
strengthening world peace. 
Allow me, Mr. Prime Minister, to express once more satisfaction 
over the efforts which you personally, together with leading statesmen 
of other noncommitted nations, are making to cleanse the international 
atmosphere. I should like to assure you that faithful to its policy of 
peace, the Soviet Government, for its part, will continue to spare no 
efforts to enable the peoples to live without fear of war, in conditions 
of peace and prosperity. 347 


